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Getting Off the Monmy Track:
An International Model Law
Solution to the Global Maternity
Discrimination Crisis
ABSTRACT

Women's roles in workplaces around the globe have been
growing steadily for the past half-century. Yet, in everything
from pay to advancement, workplace gender discrimination
persists, much of it based on women's unique role as child
bearers. Of the countless domestic and international efforts to
address maternity discrimination, none has been completely
successful. Drawing from the history of maternity leave
legislation and the examples of domestic and international
regimes, this Note proposes a unique solution to an
internationalproblem: an internationalmodel law. The Global
Maternity Protection Act model law proposed here provides
global protection for a global problem and aims to make all
women equal by providing all women with the same benefits
and protections, regardless of nationality.A model law solution
is easily adopted and enforced and provides universal equality,
a combination of objectives that is unattainable through
legislation that is eitherpurely domestic or purely international.
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I. INTRODUCTION

For every one hundred men who graduated with a college degree
of some kind in 2013, 140 women did the same.' This phenomenon is
hardly new. Women have outpaced men in earning post-secondary
degrees every year since 1982, earning a total of 44.1 million degrees
between 1982 and 2013-nearly 10 million more degrees than men
earned in the same period. 2 In 2013, the U.S. Department of
Education projected that women would "earn 61.6 [percent] of all
associate's degrees," "56.7 [percent] of all bachelor's degrees," "59.9
[percent] of all master's degrees," and "51.6 [percent] of all doctor[ate]
degrees" taken home that year.3
Yet something is happening to women between graduation and
retirement. While women earned 46 percent of law degrees in 2011,
they held only 31 percent of legal jobs and 15 percent of equity
partnerships. 4 In 2011, 36.8 percent of MBA graduates were women,
but in 2014, only 5.2 percent of Fortune 1000 CEOs were women. 5

1.
Mark J. Perry, Stunning College Degree Gap: Women Have EarnedAlmost
10 Million More College Degrees Than Men Since 1982, AEI IDEAS (May 13, 2013, 11:19
PM), http://www.aei-ideas.org/2013/05/stunning-college-degree-gap-women-have-earnedalmost- 10-million-more-college-degrees-than-men-since- 1982/ (last visited Aug. 28,
2014) [http://perma.ccN57S-K3NE] (archived Sept. 9, 2014).
2.
See id. (highlighting that between 1982 and 2013, men only earned 34.4
million degrees, while women earned 44.1 million, constituting a difference of 9.7
million).
3.
Id.
4.
ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, A Current Glance at Women
in the Law 2011, Jan. 2011, at 1, 3, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/abalmarketing/women/current-glance statistics_2011. authcheckdam.pdf [http://
perma.cc/368-AGTG] (archived Sept. 14, 2014).
5.
Women CEOs of the Fortune 1000, CATALYST (Aug. 27, 2014),
http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/women-ceos-fortune-1000 [http://perma.cclM8ZGU3ZK] (archived Sept. 9, 2010); Women's Share of MBAs Earned in the U.S., CATALYST
(July 8, 2014), http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/womens-share-mbas-earned-us
[http://perma.cc/TK26-EDSB] (archived Sept. 9, 2010).
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Women have earned the majority of PhDs since 2001 but in 2003 held
"only 35 percent of tenured or tenure-track faculty" professorships.6
Commentators have pointed to four main theories to account for
this staggering disparity between the number of women qualified for
jobs and the disproportionate number of men who receive them. 7
First, the "glass ceiling" explanation focuses on gender discrimination
due to various social causes, such as gender stereotyping. 8 These
stereotypes include frowning upon the same personality traits in
women that are prized in male leaders-traits like assertiveness and
independence. These social causes also include the expectation for
women to work in staff positions, "such as human resources and
administrative

services,

rather

than . . . positions"

controlling

business operations. 9 The second theory, the "pipeline" argument,
suggests that the historically lower number of qualified women in
occupations means few women are "in the pipeline" for leadership
positions.1 0 This argument is discredited by the fact that, for the past
thirty years, the majority of qualified graduates flowing into the
"pipeline" have been women." Third, the "evolutionary psychology"
approach suggests "that women are not genetically predisposed to
[leadership] roles."12 Finally, the "24/7 economy" has been used as an
explanation for why women are unable to keep pace with "the time
and

needed . . . in

energy

today's

competitive

business

3

environment."' Under the 24/7 economy theory, scholars argue that
women are more likely to be the head "of [a] single-parent household[]
and remain responsible for" the majority of "parenting [and
household] duties in two-parent households," and, therefore, are
unable to keep up with the demands of "traditional working
arrangements . .. configured around a career model established in
the nineteenth century" that expect complete career dedication.14
Building on this fourth approach, researchers at the University
of Kentucky have proposed a fifth explanation, the "family-work
conflict bias."' 5 "The family-work conflict bias means that just being a

6.
Jenny M. Hoobler, Grace Lemmon & Sandy J. Wayne, Women's
Underrepresentationin Upper Management, 40 ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMIcS 151, 152
(2011), available at http://www.uky.edulCenters/iwin/RTOCT12/ HooblerWomenin
Management.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZB6H-YUQ6] (archived Sept. 9, 2014).
7.
See id. at 151-52 (evaluating the four primary theories for the absence of
women in "top jobs").
Id.
8.
9.
See id. (comparing stereotypes of men and women in the workplace).
10.
See id. at 152 (explaining the argument that fewer women are in, or headed
for, leadership positions because women have not traditionally enrolled in educational
programs that prepare them for leadership).
11.
See Perry, supra note 1 (noting that "women have earned the majority of
[bachelor's] degrees for every college class since 1982").
12.
Hoobler, Lemmon & Wayne, supra note 6, at 152.
13.
Id.
14.
Id.
15.
Id.
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woman signals to a manager that her family will interfere with her
work, irrespective of whether or not that woman actually has familywork conflict, is married, has children, or has children of a certain
age."1 6 The researchers interviewed managers (both male and female)
who reported that they felt "that higher-level positions
required . . . more availability" than lower-level positions, flexibility
that they thought women's family responsibilities made them unable
to provide.' 7 The managers "generally viewed women as having a
greater [degree of] family-work conflict."' 8 The managers believed
that this family-work conflict "is incompatible with a work
environment that demands long hours and 'face time."'1 9
Independent empirical information from around the world
supports the family-work conflict bias theory. Numerous studies have
shown that "mothers are judged as less competent . . . and are less
likely to be hired and promoted" than either men or childless
women. 20 Women regularly report being made to sign pledges that
they will not become pregnant, being forced to undergo pregnancy
tests by their employers, or being harassed or fired after becoming
pregnant. 21 Two-thirds of young Arab women cannot enter the
workforce "because of weak gender discrimination laws and lack of
childcare solutions." 22 According to a 2013 report by the United
Kingdom's House of Commons Library, nearly "14 [percent] of the
340,000 women who take maternity leave" in the UK each year find
their jobs threatened upon return.2 3 The Business, Innovation and
Skills Committee of the House of Commons also reported in 2012 that

16.
Id.
17.
See id. at 153 (describing managers' explanations for "why women were not
promoted as often as males").
18.
Id.
19.
Id.
20.
See Amy J. C. Cuddy & Elizabeth Baily Wolf, Research Symposium:
Prescriptionsand Punishments for Working Moms: How Race and Work Status Affect
Judgments of Mothers, HARV. BUS. SCH. GENDER & WORK: BAcKLASH & THE DOUBLE
BIND, 2013, at 4-6, available at http://www.hbs.edulfaculty/conferences/2013-w50(archived
[http://perma.cc/C6JC-LPHE]
research-symposium/Documents/cuddy.pdf
Sept. 10, 2014) (providing studies that have evaluated perceptions of mothers in the
workplace in comparison to men and women without children).
21.
See, e.g., Maternity Protection: Not Just a Personal Issue, INT'L LABOUR
ORG. [ILO] (Nov. 23, 2012), http://www.ilo.org/globallabout-the-ilo/newsroom/news/
WCMS_193975/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2014) [http://perma.cc/WP86UA5K] (archived Sept. 10, 2014) ("ILO research has uncovered cases of women being
harassed and sacked after becoming pregnant, women being made to sign pledges that
they will not become pregnant, being forced to undergo pregnancy tests by their
employers and being denied paid maternity leave.").
Id.
22.
23.
Oliver Wright, Mind the Maternity Gap: 50,000 Women a Year Don't Get
Jobs Back After Taking Leave, INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Aug. 27, 2013, http://
www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/mind-the-maternity-gap-50000-women-ayear-dont-get-jobs-back-after-taking-leave-8785059.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2014)
[http://perma.cc/5HJ4-EVB4] (archived Sept. 10, 2014).
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. . lost their jobs as a result of
pregnancy discrimination," a staggering "8% of all pregnant women in
the workforce." 24 The Canadian Saskatchewan Human Rights
Commission reports that 10 percent of workplace discrimination
complaints cite to pregnancy discrimination.2 5
Recognizing the problem with maternity discrimination, nearly
every country in the world has implemented workplace parental
protections. Most prominently, every country in the world has
implemented paid maternity leave except for Suriname, Papua New
Guinea, and the United States. 26 Three international instrumentsthe United Nations' Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women of 1979, the International Labour
Organization's Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention of
1981, and the International Labour Organization's Maternity
Protection Convention of 2000-address the right to paid maternity
leave and other protections. The benefits of paid maternity leave
regimes-including long-term child health, 27 maternal mental
health, 28 decreased dependence on public social welfare programs,29
greater likelihood that women will return to work, 30 and social

"an estimated 30,000 [UK] women.

BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND SKILLS COMMITTEE, WRITTEN EVIDENCE
24.
SUBMITTED BY MATERNITY ACTION, 2012, H.C., 1 4.2 (U.K.) available at http://
27
2
2
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm20l3l4/cmselect/cmbis/34 /34 vw .htm (last
visited Sept. 10, 2014) [http://perma.cc/S3UM-DG4Z] (archived Sept. 10, 2014).
See ILO, Maternity Protection,supra note 21 ("The Saskatchewan Human
25.
Rights Commission in Canada says that one in ten workplace complaints of
discrimination is related to pregnancy.").
For an interactive map showing maternity leave policies around the world,
26.
see Is Paid Leave Available for Mothers of Infants?, WORLD POLICY ANALYSIS CTR.,
http://worldpolicyforum.org/global-maps/is-paid-leave-available-for-mothers-of-infants/
(last visited Aug. 31, 2014) [http://perma.cc/VD24-TNYY] (archived Sept. 10, 2014)
[hereinafter WORLD POLICY ANALYSIS].
See Christopher J. Ruhm, Parental Leave and Child Health 4, 18-21, 28
27.
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6554, 1998), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w6554 [http://perma.cc/HR2J-CW2S] (archived Sept. 10,
2014) (finding a substantial negative correlation between maternity leave and
postneonatal fatalities and discussing the beneficial effect of maternity leave on child
health).
See Pinka Chatterji & Sara Markowitz, Does the Length of Maternity Leave
28.
Affect Maternal Health?, 8, 19-27 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
10206, 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl0206 [http://perma.cc/HB9ZT3TS] (archived Sept. 10, 2014) (finding that longer maternity leave "may reduce the
number or frequency of depressive symptoms").
See Rutgers Study Finds Paid Family Leaves Leads to Positive Economic
29.
Outcomes, RUTGERS TODAY (Jan. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Rutgers Study],
http://news.rutgers.edulnews-releases/2012/01/rutgers-study-finds-20120118#.UnkIpXFJuCg
(last visited Aug. 31, 2014) [http://perma.cc/S4Q-YYAJ] (archived Sept. 10, 2014)
("[W]omen who take paid leave are 39 percent less likely to receive public assistance
and 40 percent less likely to receive food stamps in the year following a child's birth,
when compared to those who do not take any leave.").
See id. (noting "that women who use paid leave are far more likely to be
30.
working nine to 12 months after a child's birth than those who do not take any leave");
Olivier Thivenon & Anne Solaz, Labour Market Effects of Parental Leave Policies in
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morality 3 -made these regimes an attractive option for combatting
maternity discrimination. Yet, despite global efforts, discrimination
persists. In short, professional women all over the world are finding
themselves on the proverbial "mommy track" 3 2-working shorter
hours with fewer responsibilities, lower pay, and less chance of
advancement 33 -despite the many levels of protection offered in
different paid regimes.
Paid maternity leave is not enough to solve the problems of
maternity discrimination, gender inequality in the workplace, and
lack of representation of women in leadership. Recent research shows
that the biggest effect of paid maternity leave may be a nod to the
idea of equality and inclusion, more than an actual tool for it. 34
Without sufficient antidiscrimination legislation behind paid leave
regimes, most nations with paid leave have been as helpless as the
United States in attempting to stop the discrimination that women
often face when returning to work.
This Note examines the benefits and failures of existing
maternity protection regimes and proposes a new solution rooted in
OECD Countries
2, 31-32, 36, 64-67 (OECD Soc. Emp't & Migration Working
Papers, No. 141, 2013), available at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migrationhealth/labour-market-effects-of-parental-leave-policies-in-oecd-countries_5k8xb6hwlwjf-en
[http://perma.ce/4GZX-UZEY] (archived Sept. 10, 2014) (finding that extensions of paid
maternal leave lead to slightly higher female employment rates).
31.
See Lisa Belkin, The Only Argument for Paid Maternity Leave: 'Because It
Is Right, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 6, 2013, 6:02 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/11/06/argument-for-paid-maternity-leave_n_4228669.html (last visited Aug. 31,
2014) [http://perma.cc/XBR2-67US] (archived Sept. 10, 2014) (arguing that the
rightness of paid maternity leave supersedes economic and social justifications).
32.
The phrase "mommy track" was popularized after the publication of an
article in the Harvard Business Review by feminist writer and activist for corporate
women Felice N. Schwartz. Schwartz proposed that employers create two career
"tracks" for their employees, one for people dedicated to their careers and one for those
with family responsibilities who wanted extra flexibility. See Felice N. Schwartz,
Management Women and the New Facts of Life, HARV. Bus. REV., 65, 69-71 (1989).
While Schwartz did not use the phrase "mommy track," the phrase was subsequently
coined in a New York Times story reporting on the debate over proper work-life balance
following the article. See Tamar Lewin, 'Mommy Career Track' Sets Off a Furor, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 8, 1989, http://www.nytimes.com/1989/03/08/us/mommy-career-track-setsoff-a-furor.html [http://perma.cc/JN7T-UQ6A] (archived Sept. 10, 2014) (discussing the
various reactions to Schwartz's article, including some who see "a great danger in
expanding the 'mommy track,' in which women with family responsibilities are shunted
into dead-end, lower-paying jobs"). The phrase, which was originally meant to describe
Schwartz's proposal for accommodation of family responsibilities for women who chose
this second path, has come to be used mainly to describe the frustration women feel at
the inability to maintain their careers after becoming mothers.
33.
See Lewin, supra note 32 (proposing putting women on either a careeroriented track or a family-focused track and suggesting that a woman on the family
track would be "valuable to the company for her willingness to accept lower pay and
little advancement in return for a flexible schedule").
34.
See Yehonatan Givati & Ugo Troiano, Law, Economics, and Culture: Theory
of Mandated Benefits and Evidence from Maternity Leave Policies, 55 UNIV. CHI. J.L. &
ECON. 339, 341-49, 353-55 (2012) (finding a correlation between a language's use of
gender neutral pronouns, gender equality, and the length of maternity leave).
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existing domestic and international antidiscrimination legislation.
The Note focuses on three maternity leave regimes: the United
States, United Kingdom, and Sweden. Part II outlines the factual
background of the maternity discrimination problem, including the
social, health, and economic consequences for women and the history
and effectiveness of paid maternity leave as a solution. Part III
analyzes the different protection regimes that have been
implemented to fight discrimination, both international and domestic,
and the successes and failures of each. Part IV proposes a new
reform, the Global Maternity Protection Act, a model law that draws
from the best domestic and international proposals and can be
adopted by every state and modified to their unique needs. Drawing
from the best features of existing maternity protection regimes, the
proposed Global Maternity Protection Act would thus be the most
comprehensive maternity protection system in practice.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

For the purposes of this Note, maternity discrimination is
defined as inequitable workplace treatment of women with children
as compared to other workers, including both women without
children and men. 35 The problems with maternity discrimination are
36
threefold. First, discrimination adds to societal gender inequality.
Second, women are often forced to make parenting decisions based on
their fear of workplace discrimination, decisions that have a serious,
long-lasting impact on the physical and mental health of both mother
and child. 3 Third, empirical data shows that maternity
discrimination has a negative impact on the mother-the so-called
38
"motherhood penalty"-as well as on the wider economy. This Part
analyzes these problems as well as the history and efficacy of paid
maternity leave as a solution to these problems.

Cf. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
35.
Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, art. 11, U.N. Doc. A/Res/34/180 (Dec. 18, 1979) [hereinafter
CEDAW], available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm
[http://perma.cc/75JF-WN6G] (archived Sept. 10, 2014) (urging State Parties to
prohibit discrimination based on pregnancy, maternity leave, or marital status).
See infra Part II.A (indicating that maternity discrimination undermines
36.
women's position in society).
See id. (discussing the increased health risks to mother and child
37.
associated with delaying child bearing).
See T. Hogart & P. Elias, Pregnancy Discriminationat Work: Modelling the
38.
Costs (Manchester: Equal Opportunities Comm'n, Working Paper No. 39, 2005)
(finding substantial cost to employers and the state for maternity discrimination); see
also infra Part II.A (discussing the negative economic impacts of maternity
discrimination on the mother and overall economy).
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A. The "MotherhoodPenalty" and Other Problemsof Maternity
Discrimination
As detailed in the Part I, the overarching problem of maternity
discrimination is a lack of career stability and advancement for
women. This lack of stability and advancement has broad
consequences not only for the women affected but also for the wider
economy and society.
First, maternity discrimination is a basic human rights concern.
Building on the foundational affirmation of universal equality in the
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 39
international actions such as the UN's adoption of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 40 and
the establishment of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality
and the Empowerment of Women 4 ' show that gender equality is a
global policy priority. In addition to these global initiatives, numerous
regional agreements And associations, including the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 42 the Protocol to the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of
Women,48 and Inter-American Commission of Women, 44 recognize the
importance of gender equality. Many states have adopted
independent standards for gender equality as well. 45 Maternity

39.
See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III), art. 2 (Dec. 10, 1948) (recognizing a universal entitlement for
individuals to certain human rights "without distinction of any kind").
40.
See CEDAW, supra note 35. ("[T]he States Parties to the International
Covenants on Human Rights have the obligation to ensure the equal rights of men and
women to enjoy all economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights.").
41.

See UN WOMEN, About UN Women, http://www.unwomen.org/en/about-

us/about-un-women (last visited Feb. 26, 2014) [http://perma.cc/53J4-KZHP] (archived
Aug. 29, 2014) (asserting UN member states took a "historic step" in promoting gender
equality with the creation of the entity).
42.
See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 23, 2000
O.J. (C 364) 1, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text-en.pdf
[http://perma.cc/3NJF-BAYC] (archived Aug. 29, 2014) (affirming that "equality
between men and women must be ensured in all areas, including employment, work
and pay").
43.
See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the
Rights of Women, July 11, 2003, at 2, available at http://www.achpr.org/files/
instruments/women-protocol/achpr-instrproto-womeneng.pdf [http://perma.cc/KT58WTNL] (archived Aug. 29, 2014) (emphasizing the Protocol's aim of "[r]eaffirming the
principle of promoting gender equality as enshrined in in the Constitutive Act of the
African Union") (emphasis omitted).
44.
See CIM Mission and Mandate, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES,
http://www.oas.org/en/cim/about.asp (last visited Feb. 26, 2014) [http://perma.cc/XCL8V8XU] (archived Aug. 29, 2014) (stating that "the Inter-American Commission of
Women (CIM) was the first inter-governmental agency established to ensure
recognition of women's human rights").
45.
See Gender Equality Laws, IWRAW ASIA PACIFIC, http://www.iwrawap.org/laws/genderequalitylaws.htm#list (last visited Feb. 26, 2014) [http://perma.cc/
U6CG-K6PL] (archived Aug. 29, 2014) (listing gender equality laws by state).
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discrimination undermines these policies not only because maternity
discrimination is de facto gender discrimination but also because it
undermines the traditional tools for fighting for human rights,
including economic development and political action, by lessening
women's power in society. 46
Second, maternity discrimination impacts women's choices about
parenting, often with negative consequences. In 2011, the world
average age for women at the birth of their first child was between
twenty-seven and twenty-eight, while the most recent U.S. average is
twenty-five.4 7 In the United States, the labor force participation rate
of women with children under age eighteen peaked in 2000 at 73
percent, up from approximately 47 percent in 1975.48 According to the
49
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
in 2011, the median age of mothers at the birth of their first child was
nearly twenty-eight.50 In 2013, the labor force participation rate for
women aged 25-29 was 81.9 percent, 77.2 percent, and 73.6 percent
5
for Sweden, the UK, and the United States, respectively. 1 Based on
these numbers, one can assume that the majority of new mothers in

See infra Part IIB; Sabin Bieri & Annemarie Sancar, Power and poverty.
46.
Reducing Gender Inequality By Ways of Rural Development?, FAO-IFAD-ILO
Workshop, 27 (2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/social/gender-development/
42806451.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2014) (focusing on economic development as a tool
for gender equality and suggesting three fields of action for achieving gender equality:
political participation, economic participation and decision making, and social
protection).
See OECD FAMILY DATABASE, Mean Age of Mothers At First Childbirth
47.
(July 2014), http://www.oecd.org/els/soclSF_2_3.Mean..age-ofmother.atJfirst-childbirth_
Jul2014.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2014) [http://perma.cc/6UEV-H68A] (archived Sept.
10, 2014) [hereinafter OECD, Mean Age of Mothers] (comparing the "[m]ean age of
women at the birth of the first child" in 2011 from a variety of states and noting that
the statistical information for the United States was from 2008).
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Participation Rates Among
48.
Mothers, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR (May 7, 2010), http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2010/
ted_20100507.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2014) [http://perma.cc/922A-VBEW] (archived
Aug. 29, 2014).
Founded in 1961, the OECD brings together 34 member countries "to help
49.
governments foster prosperity and fight poverty through economic growth and financial
stability." Because all three states profiled in this Note are members of the OECD,
OECD reports and statistics are relied on throughout. See History, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., http://www.oecd.org/about/ history/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2014)
[http://perma.cc/P7ZB-ZV9K] (archived Aug. 29, 2014); What We Do and How, ORG. FOR
ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., http://www.oecd.org/about/whatwedoandhow/ (last
visited Feb. 26, 2014) [http://perma.cc/ZAX9-VQS6] (archived Aug. 29, 2014).
OECD, Mean Age of Mothers, supra note 47 (finding that, in 2011, mothers
50.
in OECD countries had their first child between the ages of 27 and 28).
OECD StatExtracts, Labor Force Statistics by Sex and Age - Indicators,
51.
available at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=LFSSEXAGEIR (last
visited Oct. 11, 2014) [http://perma.cc/T5AD-MZ85] (archived Oct. 22, 2014) (showing
graph providing the employment/population ratio, labor force participation rate, and
unemployment rate from 2000-2013 for every OECD state).
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Sweden, the UK, and the United States are likely to be in the labor
force when their children are born.52
In the United States, median maternal age at first birth rose
over roughly the same time frame as mothers' participation in the
workforce.5 3 In 1970, the median age of a new mother was twentytwo; by 2006, it was twenty-five. 54 Over the same period, the number
of first-time mothers over the age of thirty-five increased nearly eight
times, from one in 100 births to one in twelve.5 5 These numbers may
suggest that many women are choosing to postpone having children
rather than having them early in their careers. A recent national
study showed that most women spent an average of five years on the
job before becoming pregnant. 56 For women working in salaried
positions, the average age at first birth was thirty-one. 57 The decrease
in women's pay and career advancement over a similar age range58
could suggest that worries about career impact are part of the
calculation. Indeed, research from Northeastern University has
shown that women who wait longer to have children make more
money over their lifetimes.5 9
There is a dark side to waiting. Female fertility begins to drop
around age twenty-five; by her late thirties, a woman's chances of

52.
See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the
birth of a woman's first child is likely to occur during the woman's mid- to latetwenties, an age when the majority of women in OECD countries are working).
53.
Compare Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 48, (noting an increase in
the participation of mothers in the workforce), with T.J. Matthews & Brady E.
Hamilton, Mean Age of Mother, 1970-2000, 51 NAT'L VITAL STATISTICs REPS. No.1, Dec.
11, 2002, at 2, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr51/nvsr51_01.pdf
(last visited Sept. 24, 2014) [http://perma.cc/JLT6-KLBU] (archived Aug. 29, 2014)
(providing a graph demonstrating the trend over the period between 1970-2000 of
increasing average age of women at the time of their first child birth).
54.
Compare Median Age of Mother by Live-Birth Order, CTR. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ statab/t941x05.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2014)
[http://perma.cc/8YES-BCAV] (archived Aug. 29, 2014) (providing the 1970 statistic),
with Births: Final Data for 2011, 62 NAT'L VITAL STATISTICS REPS. No. 1, June 28,
2013, at 2, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr62/nvsr62_01_tables.pdf
(last visited Sept. 15, 2014) [http://perma.cc/ZZ6E-4B4Y] (archived Sept. 15, 2014)
(providing the 2006 statistic).
55.
T.J. Matthews & Brady E. Hamilton, Delayed Childbearing:More Women
are Having Their First Child Later in Life, NCHS DATA BRIEF NO. 21, 2009, at 2,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db21.pdf.[http://perma.cc/68UULQL9] (archived Aug. 29, 2014).
56.
See Jenna Goudreau, When Should You Become a Mom?, FORBES (Mar. 2,
2010, 9:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/03/01/family-career-working-motherforbes-woman-time-best-age-to-have-children.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2014) [http://
perma.cc/EU24-SL3U] (archived Aug. 29, 2014) (citing a study by Villanova
University's Ginamarie Ligon-Scott on the average time women spent working before
becoming pregnant).
Id.
57.
58.
See supraPart I.
59.
See Goudreau, supra note 56.
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60
conceiving can be as low as 52 percent. At the same time as chances
of conceiving begin to decline, the chances of complications climb:
women in their forties have a one-in-seventy-five chance of fetal
6
Down syndrome and a 50 percent chance of miscarriage. ' Advanced
maternal age has also been linked to significantly higher rates of
autism. 62 According to a decade-long study conducted at the
University of California, Davis, the chances of autism increase by 18
percent for every five-year increase in maternal age, so that a child
born to a woman over forty had a 50 percent greater chance of
developing autism than a child born to a woman in her late
twenties.6 3 Advanced maternal age has also been linked to a variety
of other birth-related conditions, including low birth-weight,
64
chromosomal aberrations, and congenital abnormalities. In short,
their
further
to
women's decisions to put off having children in order
career goals may have significant medical consequences.
Finally, and perhaps with the most universal appeal, is the
economic burden of the "motherhood penalty." Studies suggest that,
on average, women suffer a wage penalty of 5 percent per child, a
reduction that cannot be accounted for by human capital or
occupational factors. 65 According to the Pew Research Center, in 2012
women's hourly wages were, on average, 84 percent of what men
made in the same job. 66 For young women ages 25-34, the pay gap is
closer to 93 percent. 67 Because motherhood is a factor in this
disparity, this likely means that the pay gap between non-mothers
and mothers is roughly the same as between non-mothers and men68
9 percent versus 7 percent.
Another poll from the nonprofit group Family Inequality showed
women's wages as a percentage of men's, adjusted for two variables:

Id. (noting that "at the ages of 35 to 39" a woman "ha[s] only a 52%
60.
likelihood of becoming pregnant in the first year of trying").
Id.
61.
See Univ. of Calif. Davis Health Sys., Link Between Advanced MaternalAge
62.
and Autism Confirmed, SCIENCE DAILY (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.sciencedaily.com/
020 8 0 24
11.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2014) [http://perma.cc/C4H51
releases/2010/02/10
C28B] (archived Aug. 29, 2014) (citing Janie F. Shelton, Daniel J. Tancredi & Irva
Hertz-Picciotto, Independent and Dependent Contributionsof Advanced Maternal and
PaternalAges to Autism Risk, AUTISM RESEARCH (2010)).
Id.
63.
See id. ("Earlier studies have observed that advanced maternal age is a risk
64.
factor for a variety of other birth-related conditions, including infertility, early fetal
loss, low birth-weight, chromosomal aberrations and congenital anomalies.").
See Cuddy, supra note 20, at 4.
65.
RES. Soc. &
On Pay Gap, Millennial Women Near Parity-ForNow, PEW
66.
3 2
2
DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/ 01 /1 /11/on[http://
2014)
26,
Feb.
visited
(last
pay-gap-millennial-women-near-parity-for-now/
perma.cc/YR27-JWHW] (archived Aug. 29, 2014).
Id.
67.
See id. (stating that motherhood is one factor for the disparity in pay for
68.
women aged 25-34 and women over 34).
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children and education.6 9 While average wages for women hovered at
approximately 70-80 percent of men's at every education level, there
was a stark difference between the overall average for women and
women in the "never married, no kids" category. 70 Women in the
latter category earned between 83 and 93 percent of what men did,
compared to the overall average of between 71 and 79 percent. 7 '
Having no children was a greater indicator of wage equality even
than working more than fifty hours a week.72 The data also suggests
that even women who do not yet have children might be suffering
from the early effects of the motherhood penalty: while the income
parity was better for the category containing women who were
married but childless, it was still lower than that for unmarried,
childless women, at between 80 and 87 percent of comparable men's
salaries.73 This data suggests that even the possibility of impending
motherhood, as suggested by marriage, may be an economic penalty
to women.74
These demonstrable economic penalties to motherhood not only
threaten the economic stability of these women but also have a
negative impact on the economy as a whole. A 2011 McKinsey study
showed that increasing women's participation in the U.S. workforce
to a level more comparable to Sweden's could add 3 to 4 percent to the
size of the U.S. economy. 7 Moreover, economists theorize that,
because women are more likely to spend additional income, the
cumulative effect of closing the pay gap "could be extremely

69.
See Belinda Luscombe, Ten Things You Didn't Know About the Gender Gap,
TIME (Nov. 11, 2013), http://healthland.time.com/2013/11/11/ten-things-you-didntknow-about-the-gender-gap/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2014) [http://perma.cc/J5RT-8LGW]
(archived Aug. 29, 2014) (displaying women's median earnings as a proportion of
men's, by education in graph 2) (citing 2011 American Community Survey 1-Year

Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/
jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_11_1YRS0201&prodType=table
(last visited
Nov. 7, 2014) [http://perma.cc/C4QS-3FN2] (archived Nov. 7, 2014)).
70.
See id. (displaying the gap in earnings between single and married women
as well as married with children women in graph 2).
71.

Id.

72.
See id. (showing on graph 1 that women working 49-59 hours per week
earned 87.3 percent as much as male counterparts, while women working over 60
hours per week earned 85 percent as much as men).
73.
See id. (finding that across all education levels, married women with no
children in this study earned less than their female single peers who also did not have
children).
74.
See id. (explaining that "[m]arital status has more influence on the wage
differential between men than education does" and that having kids increases the wage
differential).
75.
See Joanna Barsh & Lareina Yee, Unlocking the Full Potentialof Women in
the U.S. Economy, WALL STREET JOURNAL EXECUTIVE TASKFORCE FOR WOMEN IN THE

ECONOMY 2011, 2011, at 4, available at http://www.mckinsey.com/careers/women/
Insights -and-publications/-/media/Reports/Women/ExecSummWSJPreviewSpecialRep
ort.ashx [http://perma.cc/B8BK-QGSD] (archived Oct. 22, 2014).
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important in terms of products purchased and jobs created." In
short, "[i]f you're not using your human resources to your full
.
capacity, you're leaving money on the table.""
Keeping in mind the problems of maternity discrimination that
maternity protections are designed to combat, Part II.B examines,
first, the history of paid maternity leave as the major mechanism of
protection in modern maternity protection regimes and, second, its
effectiveness in combatting these problems.

B. From Paternalismto Parity:The History of Paid Maternity Leave
Reform
Maternity leave began as a function of industrialization in
Europe in the mid- to late-nineteenth century. 78 High infant
mortality rates proliferated during the early industrial revolution,
most likely as a function of urbanization and unsafe methods of
artificial feeding for mothers who were unable to breastfeed. 79
Contemporaries posited that the high rates of infant deaths were due
to the increasingly large percentage of women working outside the
home, under the dual theories that married women working outside
the home was a general threat and that working-class women were
ignorant and incapable of proper childcare. 80 These attitudes were
typical of Victorian morality, which held that a woman's proper place
was the domestic sphere; thus, "the assumption that a working
mother entailed a neglected child was sacrosanct." 8 '
Calls for maternity leave began in the late nineteenth century
largely out of concern for the welfare of the child rather than any
concern for the working conditions of the mother.82 A paper delivered
at the 1892 Annual Meeting of the British Medical Association that
claimed to link maternal employment to infant mortality rates
83
defined the literature on infant mortality for the next two decades.

76.

Laura Bassett, Closing the Gender Wage Gap Would Create "Huge"

Economic Stimulus, Economists Say, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 24, 2012), available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/24/gender-wage-gap-economic-stimulus-n
2007588.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2014) [http://perma.cclU6V4-GVVF] (archived Oct.
22, 2014).
77.
Id.

78.

See Carol Dyhouse, Working Class Mothers and Infant Mortality in

England, 1895-1914, 12 J. SOC. HIST. 248 253-54 & n.2 (1978) (highlighting the push
in industrialized England to reduce its infant mortality rate among working women).
See id. at 251 (noting a correlation between the infant mortality rate and
79.
inadequate forms of sewage disposal as well as artificial breastfeeding).
See id. (noting a commonly held assumption of the time that a working
80.
mother meant a neglected child).
81.
Id.
See id. at 252 (citing a study focusing on infant mortality in the county of
82.
Staffordshire).
See id. (describing how the paper led to a resolution presented to
83.
Parliament).
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In England, the First National Conference on Infant Mortality of
1906 issued resolutions calling for the government "to extend ... a
legal prohibition on the industrial employment of women" for three
months after childbirth. 84 By that time, Germany had already
adopted a compulsory maternity leave law, in 1883; Sweden came
next in 1891.85 In 1919, the International Labour Organization (ILO)
(then an organization of the League of Nations) made a multinational
recommendation "advocat[ing] three fundamentals of maternity
protection: a leave period, cash benefits, and job protection." 86
Outside Europe, in 1910, the International Feminist Congress
meeting in Buenos Aires, Argentina, put forward a comprehensive
program that called for women's suffrage, access to education, and
wide-ranging social legislation to protect working women.8 7 However,
the primary motivation for these laws continued to be protectionist
rather than feminist.8 8
It was not until the 1960s that maternity leave evolved from a
policy designed to prohibit women from working shortly after
childbirth to one meant to offer new parents time off with their
newborn as well as job security. 8 9 During the next two decades,
countries that already had leave requirements added job protections,
while other states enacted new regimes providing job-protected
maternity leave. 90 This shift in goals can be traced through the
revisions in the Maternity Protection Conventions of 1919, 1952, and
2000.91 The 1919 convention required that "a woman shall not be
permitted to work during the six weeks following her confinement,"
reflecting the predominant focus on paternalism, and permitted
employers to dismiss women if their absence exceeded six weeks or
gave rise to an illness "rendering her unfit for work," evidencing a

84.
Id. at 253-54.
85.
See Christopher J. Ruhm & Jackqueline L. Teague, ParentalLeave Policies
in Europe and North America 2 (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
5065, 1995), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w5065.pdf [http://perma.cc/3GEU4RTV] (archived Aug. 29, 2014) (discussing the spread of legislated maternity leave
across Europe).
86.
Id.
87.
See A Brief History of the Inter-American Commission on Women,
ORGANIZACION DE LOS ESTADOS AMERICANOS [ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES],
http://www.oas.org/en/cim/history.asp [http://perma.cc/7QT3-U894] (archived Aug. 29,
2014) (describing the creation of the Pan American Association for the Advancement of
Women).
88.
See Ruhm & Teague, supra note 85, at 2-3 (noting that the laws were
focused on "the health of the child and the mother" and were meant to "restore women
to their 'proper' roles as mother and wife").
89.
See id. at 3 (noting the shift towards promotion "of time off work to care for
newborns" and "job security for parents").
90.
See id. ("Portugal, Spain, Finland and Canada instituted job-protected
leave during the 1969-71 period.").
91.
See discussion infra Part III.B(iii) (detailing the Maternity Protection
Convention of 2000); infra note 278 and accompanying text (summarizing the
requirements of the 1919 and 1952 Conventions).
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lack of concern with job security.92 By 1952, the convention had
adopted the term "maternity leave" for a period of twelve weeks, with
at least a six-week mandatory leave.9 3 While both these changes may
suggest a more liberal view of the purposes of maternity leave than
the 1919 convention, the 1952 convention allowed for dismissal of
employees on leave without the limiting justifications present in the
1919 convention, thus providing even less job security. 94 The 2000
convention lengthened the leave period to fourteen weeks, with six
weeks of compulsory leave, and reversed the prior conventions'
positions on dismissal by affirmatively stating "[i]t shall be unlawful
for an employer to terminate the employment of a woman during her
pregnancy or absence on leave," evidencing concern both for giving
95
women more leave and for job security after leave.
The endurance of compulsory leave laws through this shift has
left lingering questions about the motivation of these laws: do they
stand as part of a paternalistic desire to ensure women fulfill their
roles as mothers, 96 or do they offer additional job security protections
for women who might otherwise feel pressured to return to work
early? Today, nearly all industrialized nations offer periods of
maternity leave, which may or may not be compulsory, along with
income support.9 7
Paid leave has been effective in combatting many aspects of the
problems detailed in Part II.A. Some commentators view social
morality as the ultimate purpose of offering paid maternity leave,9 8 in
line with the shifting purposes behind the laws beginning in the
1960s. As for health, the provision of paid parental leave has been
linked to a number of positive health outcomes for both mothers and
children. A 2004 study of U.S. mothers found that returning to work

See ILO, C003 - Maternity Protection Convention, 1919 (No. 3) arts. 3(a), 4,
92.
Oct. 29, 1919 [hereinafter 1919 MPC] (emphasis added), available at http://www.ilo.org/
dyn/normlex/en/fpNORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::Pl2100_ILOCODE:C003 [http://perma.cc
S6EF-7N77] (archived Oct. 23, 2014).
See ILO, C103 - Maternity Protection Convention (Revised), 1952 (No. 103)
93.
art. 3(2)-(3), June 28, 1952 [hereinafter 1952 MPC], available at http://www.ilo.org
dyn/normlex/en/fpNORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100LO_CODE:C103 [http://perma.cc/
SU2N-RX9Z] (archived Oct. 23, 2014).
See id. art. 6.
94.
95.
See ILO, C183 - Maternity Protection Convention, 2000 (No. 183) arts. 4(1),
4(4), 8(1), June 15, 2000, available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/fp
=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILOCODE:C183 [http://perma.cc/W2PV-BPJG]
(archived Oct. 23, 2014).
See Ruhm & Teague, supra note 85, at 2-3 (noting that the laws were
96.
meant to "restore women to their 'proper' roles as mother and wife").
See id. ("Income support is provided during the leave period in almost all
97.
industrialized countries, with wage replacement rates generally exceeding 50% and
often surpassing 80%.").
See, e.g., Belkin, supra note 31 (arguing that economic considerations
98.
should not enter into a decision to provide paid maternity leave but that "[t]he only
real reason is because it is right").
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later may reduce the quantity and frequency of depressive symptoms
in new mothers. 99 Moreover, a twenty-five year study of nine
European countries found that more generous leave policies
substantially reduced the risk of death for infants and young
children, 100 echoing the original purpose behind maternity leave
policies, and concluded that parental leave may be a cost-effective
way of bettering child health.' 0 This conclusion highlights both the
health and economic benefits of maternity leave policies. 0 2
Similarly, a twelve-year U.S. study concluded that providing
maternity leave was an economic benefit to both families and
businesses. The study found that women who use[d] paid leave were
significantly more likely to be back at work nine to twelve months
following childbirth and reported increased wages. 103 Researchers
also discovered lower costs to businesses "in the form of employee
replacement costs" and lower costs to the government due to
decreased dependence on public social welfare programs.104 A fortyyear study of OECD countries confirmed this positive impact on
women's ability to return to work on an international scale, finding a
positive influence on female employment rates, on the gender ratio in
employment, and on the average number of hours worked by women
relative to men for leave policies of no more than two years. 0 5
However, paid leave policies have not been without their
problems. As discussed above, there is a debate about whether
compulsory leave policies reflect a continued paternalistic motive of
the state to force a woman into her "traditional role."106 Moreover, the
same examination of OECD findings cited above also found that the
provision of paid leave "widen[ed] the earnings gender gap among
full-time employees." 0 7 Commentators have pointed out that even in
countries like Sweden, where paid leave policies are most generous

99.
See Chatterji, supra note 28, at 26-27 ("The results suggest that longer
leave from work is associated with considerable declines in depressive symptoms.").
100.
Ruhm, Parental Leave and Child Health, supra note 27, at 2, 18-19
(describing the study and finding that "[p]arental leave is estimated to have a
substantial negative effect on infant hortality").
101.
See id. at 28 ("This analysis leads considerable credence to the view that
parental leave has favorable and possibly cost-effective impacts on pediatric health.").
102.
See id. at 25-32 (discussing the relationship between economic and health
benefits of parental leave).
See Rutgers Study, supra note 29.
103.
104.
Id.
105.
See Th6venon, supra note 30, J 2, 12, 32, 65, 68-70, 80-81 (finding
positive influence of short-term paid leave on female employment indicators at a macro
level).
106.
See Ruhm & Teague, supra note 85, at 3 ("Often the motivation for the
policies was to restore women to their 'proper' roles as mother and wife.") (footnote
omitted) (citing Meryl Frank & Robyn Lipner, History of Maternity Leave in Europe
and the United States, in ZIGLER AND FRANK, THE PARENTAL LEAVE CRISIS 3-22
(1988)).
107.
See Thivenon, supranote 30,
2, 79, 82.
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and most successful, the majority of women work in the public sector
and are even more unrepresented in corporate management than in
the United States. 0 8
Taken together, the history, successes, and failures of modern
maternity leave programs offer three conclusions. First, the modern
maternity leave system is a vestige of a scheme developed over a
century and a half ago with very different policy goals than today.
Nonetheless, the modern goals of maternity leave, including gender
equality, children's and maternal health, and economic development,
continue to be served by periods of extended, paid maternity leave.
However, paid maternity leave alone is not an effective policy for
providing long-term equality or economic benefits to professional
women. This makes sense given that the initial Victorian framers of
maternity leave regimes never envisioned a system aimed at
achieving gender goals of any kind, much less equality.109 Thus, a
successful scheme of maternity protection must include not only
maternity leave but other protections as well. Part III examines
different types of maternity protection regimes, both domestic and
international in scope, to determine what works and what does not.
III. ANALYSIS

As discussed in Part II.A, gender equality and the need for
maternity protection have been recognized repeatedly on the
international stage as human rights concerns. Numerous domestic
and international solutions have been proposed. Part III.A discusses
maternity protection regimes of three countries, including provisions
for both maternity leave and other protections, to determine the most
and least successful parts of each. Part III.B offers a discussion of

See infra Part III.A(iii) (discussing the benefits and problems of Sweden's
108.
regime); We Did It!: The Rich World's Quiet Revolution: Women are Gradually Taking
Over the Workplace, ECONOMIST (Dec. 30, 2009) [hereinafter We Did It'|, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/15174489 (last visited Aug. 31, 2014) [http://perma.cc/
TTW6-9G9P] (archived Sept. 11, 2014) (noting that the Scandinavian countries "have
the highest levels of female employment in the world and far fewer of the social
problems that plague Britain and America"); Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development [OECD], Closing the Gender Gap: Act Now - Sweden, OECD Country
Note (Dec. 17, 2012) [hereinafter Closing the Gender Gap], available at http://www
.oecd.org/sweden/Closing%20the%2OGender%2OGap%20-%20Sweden%20FINAL.pdf
(last visited Aug. 29, 2014) [http://perma.cc/P4VV-FWQB?type=pdf] (archived Aug. 29,
2014) (summarizing Sweden's policies and showing the workforce participation rate of
women in Sweden, including in senior management).
See Carolyn Malone, The Gendering of Dangerous Trades: Government
109.
Regulation of Women's Work in the White Lead Trade in England, 1892-1898, 8 J.
WOMEN'S HIST. 15, 26-30 (1996) (explaining that regulations of women's labor during
the Victorian period, which were based on morality, women's health, infant mortality,
and motherly duties, were designed to severely limit women's work and ultimately
force women back into the home).
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three international conventions that speak to maternity and their
successes and failures.
A. Domestic Efforts
Nearly every state mandates that employers offer some kind of
maternity leave.1 10 These regimes have four significant categories,
variations in which set one system apart from another: (1) the
percentage of their salaries women continue to receive (ranging from
100 percent of normal salary"' to federal minimum wage 1l 2), (2) the
amount of time and flexibility offered (from sixty days"x3 to 480
days,11 4 with time sometimes offered both before and after birth"15 ),
(3) who actually pays the benefit (the employer 116 or social
security" 7), and (4) whether the benefit is also available to spouses
and co-parents." 8
The three states discussed here are representative of the major
variations in these four features. The Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA) is representative of low-protection regimes and reflects only
category (2), requiring that employers offer at least twelve weeks of
leave for general family and medical situations, including the birth of
a child.1 9 Employers who choose to pay benefits do so themselves.120
The United Kingdom's Maternity and Parental Leave Regulations of
1999 represent all four categories: women receive (1) both a
percentage of their salary and a flat fee, (2) up to one year of leave, (3)
benefits are paid by employers, and (4) parental leave is available to

110.
See WORLD POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 26 (indicating that the United
States, Suriname, and Papua New Guinea are the only three countries that have no
paid maternity leave).
111.
See Alyson Hurt, Erin Killian & JoElla Straley, Time with a Newborn:
Maternity Leave Policies Around the World, NPR (Aug. 8, 2011, 3:58 PM), http://
www.npr.org/2011/08/09/137062676/time-with-a-newborn-maternity-leave-policiesaround-the-world (last visited Feb. 26, 2014) (subscription required) [http://perma.cc/
KN78-SD9V?type=image] (archived Sept. 15, 2014) (indicating that China and Russia
have policies of this nature).
112.
See id. (indicating that Australia has a policy of this nature).
113.
See id. (indicating that Mozambique and Malaysia have policies of this
nature).
114.
See id. (indicating that Sweden has a policy of this nature).
115.
See id. (indicating that Croatia has a policy of this nature).
116.
See id. (indicating that Saudi Arabia and Syria have policies of this nature).
117.
See id. (indicating that France and Sweden have policies of this nature).
118.
See id. (indicating that Norway has a policy of this nature).
119.
See Family and Medical Leave Act, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/whd/fmlal (last visited Aug. 31, 2014) [http://perma.cc/S54U-MUKQ
] (archived Sept. 15, 2014) (providing an overview of the Family and Medical Leave
Act).
120.
See generally Kenneth Matos & Ellen Galinsy, 2012 National Study of
Employers, FAMILIES & WORK INST. (2012), http://familiesandwork.org/downloads/
2012NationalStudyofEmployers.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2014) [http://perma.cc/Z9XRKR8G] (archived Sept. 18, 2014).
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both parents. 121 Sweden's Parental Leave Act of 1995 also represents
all four categories, but on different terms than the UK's: women
receive pay (1) at or near their full salary (2) for up to 480 days (3) to
be paid by social security, (4) with part of that time reserved for use
by their co-parent.1 2 2 All three systems are discussed in detail below.
1.

The United States

The United States does not have a national and comprehensive
regulatory regime dealing with maternity leave and discrimination.
Instead, four major federal statutes cover various pregnancy-related
employment issues. The FMLA requires that employers offer at least
twelve workweeks of leave per year for a number of family,
caregiving, and medical situations, including the birth of a child and
caring for the child within the first year after birth.123 However, the
FMLA does not require that this leave be paid. 124 Next, the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA) amended Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit discrimination in employment "on
the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions." 2 5
The PDA creates an actionable mandate that affected women "shall
be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including
receipt of benefits."1 26 Third, the Americans with Disabilities Act

121.
See generally Terms and Conditions of Employment: The Maternity and
Parental Leave etc. Regulations 1999, 1999, S.I. No. 3312 (U.K.) [hereinafter UK
Regulations], available at http://www.1egislation.gov.uk/uksi/1999/3312/pdfs/uksi
19993312_en.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2014) [http://perma.cc/UJX2-4GMYI (archived
Sept. 18, 2014) (indicating that parental leave is available and outlining parental leave
rights); Maternity Pay and Leave, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/maternity-payleave/overview (last updated July 29, 2014) [http://perma.cc/74MX-R4W5] (archived
Sept. 11, 2014) (discussing the various forms of employee benefit programs employers
offer).
[Parental
Leave
Act]
(Svensk
122.
See generally Foraledighetslag
f6rfattningssamling [SFS] 1995:584) (Swed.) [hereinafter Parental Leave Act],
available at http://www.notisum.se/rnp/sls/lag/19950584.htm (last visited Sept. 19,
2014) [http://perma.cc/9FF8-6LTJ] (archived Sept. 19, 2014), translated in Parental
Leave Act (1995:548), available at http://www.government.se/content/1/c6/10/49/85/
fl6b785a.pdf. [http://perma.cc/MYF6-V59Q] (archived Sept. 11, 2014) (outlining the
availability of parental leave in Sweden); Gender and Equality in Sweden, SWEDENSE,
https://sweden.se/society/gender-equality-in-sweden/ [http://perma.cc/YHE6-5QLP]
(archived Sept. 11, 2014) (detailing the benefits available to parents under Sweden's
maternity and paternity leave policy).
123.
Family and Medical Leave Act, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 102, 107 Stat. 6, 11
(1993) (amended 2009) [hereinafter FMLA] (setting forth the terms of the mandatory
leave requirement).
See id. (failing to implement employer-paid leave requirements).
124.
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)
125.
[hereinafter PDA], available at http://wwwl.eeoc.gov//laws/statutes/pregnancy.cfm
?renderforprint= (last visited Aug. 31, 2014) [http://perma.cc/87EG-V238] (archived
Sept. 11, 2014).
See id. (setting forth legal protections for women affected by "pregnancy,
126.
childbirth, or related medical conditions").
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(ADA) covers impairments relating to pregnancy that amount to
temporary disabilities, including gestational diabetes and
preeclampsia.127 Supreme Court cases had previously limited an
employee's ability to bring a disability claim based on pregnancy.128
However, the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA) broadened the
statutory definition of "disability," which had previously been
narrowly interpreted by the Supreme Court, and made it easier to
establish that a condition is a statutory disability.129 It has been
suggested that the enactment of the ADAAA might change this
determination. 130 Most recently, in 2010, the passage of the
Affordable Care Act included an amendment to the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) giving nursing mothers the "right to pump." 131
Providing an additional workplace protection to new mothers, the
"right to pump" requires employers to offer new mothers break time
and a private location to pump breast milk while at work. 132
However, even in combination, these laws provide incomplete
protection for new mothers and fall far below the standards of most
industrialized states.13 3 While the U.S. system makes it an outlier

127.
See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 102, 104
Stat. 327, 331-33 (1990) [hereinafter ADA] (preventing employment discrimination
against individuals with disabilities); Pregnancy Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/pregnancy.cfm (last visited Aug.
31, 2014) [http://perma.cc/8HLQ-DRXE] (archived Sept. 11, 2014) (explaining that
"impairments resulting from pregnancy (for example, gestational diabetes or
preeclampsia .. .) may be disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA)").
128.
See, e.g., Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 143-44 (1977) (holding
that excluding pregnancy-related absences from disability compensation coverage was
not per se discrimination and that Title VII only applied if a "plaintiff [could]
demonstrate that exclusion of pregnancy from compensated conditions [was] a mere
pretext . .. to effect ... discrimination against. . . one sex or the other"); Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 489-91, 494-97 (1974) (upholding California's exclusion of normal
pregnancy from the definition of disability).
129.
See Fact Sheet on the EEOC's Final Regulations Implementing the ADAAA,
U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/regulations/adaaa
factsheet.cfm (last visited Aug. 31, 2014) [http://perma.cclKG4E-VUEH] (archived
Sept. 12, 2014) (providing an overview of the scope and effect of the ADAAA).
130.
See generally Jeannette Cox, Pregnancy as "Disability"and the Amended
Americans with Disabilities Act, 53 B.C. L. REV. 443 (2012) (noting that, since the
enactment of the ADAAA, some district court cases have addressed the question of
whether pregnancy is a disability); see also sources cited infra note 162.
131.
See 29 U.S.C. § 207(r) (2012) (setting forth accommodations employers
must provide for nursing mothers); Fact Sheet #73: Break Time for Nursing Mothers
under the FLSA, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR (August 2013), http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/
compliance/whdfs73.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2014) [http://perma.cc/3M72-YJB7]
(archived Sept. 16, 2014) (explaining how the PPACA modified the FLSA to mandate
accommodations for nursing mothers).
132.
See 29 U.S.C. § 207(r) (setting forth accommodations employers must
provide for nursing mothers); Fact Sheet #73: Break Time for Nursing Mothers under
the FLSA, supra note 131.
See Hurt, Killian & Straley, supra note 111 (explaining that "the U.S. is the
133.
only industrialized nation that does[] [not] mandate" paid parental leave).
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among other nations, that the national government has maintained a
hands-off approach is not surprising. Commitments to state
sovereignty and free markets in particular hinder the United States
government's ability and desire to offer nationwide mandates.1 34
Beginning with state action, only three U.S. states-California,
New Jersey, 135 and Rhode Island 136 -mandate paid maternity
leave.13 7 These state efforts offer some room for hope that this state
action can be a model for national legislation. For example, the recent
amendment to the FLSA came after over a dozen states adopted
similar "right to pump" laws; similarly, Congress adopted the FMLA
after twenty-three states put similar measures in place.' 3 8 Recently,
Washington became the fourth state to begin taking steps toward
mandating paid maternity leave. 3 9 If more states join California,
New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Washington, the federal government
may be more likely to follow.1 40 In fact, at the White House Summit
on Working Families, held in June 2014, U.S. President Barack
Obama called for equal pay, paid leave, workplace flexibility, greater
access to child care options, and increased workplace discrimination
protections, including protections against pregnancy discrimination.

134.
See Luisa Blanchfield, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40750, THE U.N.
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN
(CEDAW): ISSUES IN THE U.S. RATIFICATION DEBATE 1, 8 (2010) (discussing the U.S.'s
concern that commitments to international treaties will "undermine national
sovereignty").
135.
Both California and New Jersey provide for up to six weeks of paid leave,
available to either parent. Both states implemented the law as an expansion of their
disability insurance program and offer partial wage replacement paid from payroll
taxes. See Expecting Better. A State-by-State Analysis of Laws that Help New Parents,
NAT'L P'SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES 23-24, 36 (2d ed. May 2012) [hereinafter
Expecting Better], http://www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/work-family/
expecting-better.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2014) [http://perma.cc/43SL-A24F] (archived
Sept. 12, 2014) (describing the maternity leave requirements provided in California
and New Jersey's disability insurance programs).
See Liza Mundy, Daddy Track: The Case for Paternity Leave, ATLANTIC
136.
(Dec. 22, 2013, 9:25 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/01/the-daddytrack/355746/ [http://perma.cc/3WXS-Z4GD] (archived Sept. 12, 2014) (indicating that
Rhode Island offers four weeks of paid leave for both mothers and fathers).
For an interactive map illustrating the pregnancy and nursing protections
137.
in the American states, see Employment Protectionsfor Workers Who Are Pregnantor
Nursing, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR WOMEN'S BUREAU, http://www.dol.gov/wb/map/ (last
visited Oct. 23, 2014) [http://perma.cc/KE48-AGHM] (archived Oct. 23, 2014).
See Expecting Better, supra note 135, at 11-12 (citing J. Waldfogel, Family
138.
Leave Coverage:Family Leave Coverage in the 1990s, MONTHLY LABOR REV., Oct. 1999,
at 13, available at http://www.bls.gov/mlr/1999/10/art2full.pdf [http://perma.ccfU99QBKGQ] (archived Sept. 12, 2014)) (describing the right to pump policy added in the
2010 amendments to the FLSA and noting that "23 states passed FMLA laws prior to
the 1993 enactment of the federal FMLA").
139.
See id. at 47 (noting that Washington appears to be following California
and New Jersey in mandating paid maternity leave).
See id. at 12 (explaining that state laws paved the way for the federal
140.
government to pass the national FMLA, which indicates that "state innovation can
pave the way for national change").
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This may be a sign that national leaders are beginning to support a
more comprehensive and protective regime. 141
The federal government traditionally favors private, free-market
solutions to employment issues. Unfortunately, businesses have
responded with only marginal maternity protections. According to the
Families and Work Institute, in 2012, approximately 58 percent of
U.S. employers offered some replacement pay for maternity leave.142
However, of those employers, only approximately 9 percent offered
full pay to women on leave, while 63 percent offered only partial
pay.143 Another 28 percent of employers said it depends upon the
situation.144 Notably, these numbers were down from the Families
and Work Institute's 2005 estimates, where fewer employers reported
offering pay, but approximately 17 percent of employers who offered
some type of pay reported offering full paid leave.14 5 The current
numbers leave 42 percent of women without any replacement pay,
with the vast majority of the remaining women receiving only partial
pay.146
In addition to state action and free-market solutions, court
decisions also impact U.S. domestic policy. The landmark U.S. case on
pregnancy discrimination is General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, in which
the Supreme Court refused to recognize pregnancy as a disease or
discrimination based on pregnancy as sex or disability
discrimination.14 7 The Court based this conclusion on the fact that,
because not all women were pregnant, discrimination against
pregnancy did not ordinarily equal sex discrimination. 148 One year
later, in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, the Court held that that provision

141.
See The White House Summit on Working Families: The Issues,
WORKINGFAMILIESSUMMIT.ORG (June 23, 2014), http://workingfamiliessummit.org/issues
[http://perma.cclMX7J-3F5P] (archived Oct. 23, 2014) (summarizing the strategies "to
give all workers the best chance to succeed at work and at home"); Remarks by
President Obama at the White House Summit on Working Families, WHITEHOUSE.GOV
(June 23, 2014, 1:51 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/23/remarkspresident-obama-white-house-summit-working-families-june-23-2014 [httpl/perma.cc/6PKTXHG3] (archived Nov. 17, 2014).
142.
On average, 54 percent of small employers (50-99 employees) and 68
percent of large employers (1,000 or more employees) offer some form of replacement
pay to women during maternity leave. See Matos & Galinsy, supra note 120, at 20,
tbl.7 (evaluating replacement pay offered to women by employers during parental
leave).
143.
Id. at 21, tbl.8.
144.
Id.
145.
Id.
146.
See id. at 21, tbl.7 (indicating that 58 percent of women on maternity leave
receive "at [1]east [s]ome [r]eplacement [p]ay," while the remaining 42 percent of
women on maternity leave receive no replacement pay).
147.
See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976) (explaining
that pregnancy "is ... confined to women, but it is in other ways significantly different
from the typical covered disease or disability" and recognizing "[t]he District Court
[determination] that [pregnancy] is not a disease").
148.
See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 135.
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of sick pay for other temporary disabilities and illnesses, but not
pregnancy-related disability and illness, did not violate Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.149 However, the Court also held that this
policy would violate Title VII if the employee was denied payment as
a "pretex[t] designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the
members of one sex."150 Thus, employers could opt out of providing
pregnancy benefits as part of their disability plan without violating
any employment law.1 5' These cases essentially foreclose challenges
under Title VII to all but the most blatant maternity discrimination.
Following the decisions in Gilbert and Satty, Congress passed an
amendment to Title VII known as the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,
which provided a definition of discrimination "because of' or "based
on sex" that included discrimination "because of or on the basis of
pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions" and required
that "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth or related medical
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their

ability or inability to work." 52 The legislative history of the PDA
shows that Congress was motivated by its understanding that "[tihe
assumption that women will become pregnant and leave the labor
force leads to the view of women as marginal workers, and is the root
of the discriminatory practices which keep women in low-paying and
dead-end jobs." 153 Still, even after the PDA's passage, Gilbert's
rationale persevered. 154
However, there has been new movement in litigation regarding
pregnancy discrimination and the definition of disability since the
enactment of the ADAAA.1 5 While courts continue to follow the longstanding rule of refusing to recognize pregnancy as a per se disability,

See Satty, 434 U.S. at 142-43 (explaining that "[i]f a company's business
149.
necessitates the adoption of particular leave policies, Title VII does not prohibit the
company from applying these policies to all leaves of absence, including pregnancy
leaves; Title VII is not violated even though the policies may burden female
employees").
150.
Id. at 144.
151.
See id. (holding that the disputed "disability-benefits plan does not violate
Title VII because of its failure to cover pregnancy-related disabilities").
152.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
153.
H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 3 (1978).
See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 S. Ct. 701, 702 (2009) (rejecting the
154.
claims of women whose pensions were calculated using a pre-PDA method that gave
less credit for pregnancy leave than disability leave because, under Gilbert, "an
exclusion of pregnancy from a disability-benefits plan providing general coverage [was]
not a gender based discrimination at all.").
See, e.g., Jeudy v. Holder, No. 10-22873-CIV, 2011 WL 5361076, at *4 (S.D.
155.
Fla. Nov. 7, 2011) (explaining that pregnancy is not generally considered a disability
without unusual circumstances, but "[wihether a person is disabled ... must be
determined on a case by case basis"); Sam-Sekur v. Whitmore Group, Ltd., No. 11-CV4938 (JFB)(GRB), 2012 WL 2244325, at *7-8 (E.D.N.Y. June 15, 2012) (explaining that
pregnancy is not generally considered a disability but could be in extremely rare cases).
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since the enactment of the ADAAA, federal district courts have
become more willing to evaluate pregnancy on a case-by-case basis in
cases alleging disability discrimination. 1 56 However, as of February
2014, no case has used the ADAAA to recognize pregnancy as a
disability, at least not without evidence of an aggravating health
condition.
The combination of the PDA and ADAAA offers one of the most
effective maternity protections in the U.S. regime.15 7 This is because
the ADAAA expands an employer's duty to accommodate temporary
disability'" The PDA, in turn, requires that pregnant employees be
treated the same as those with temporary disabilities. 1e This
combination offers an added level of job security to pregnant women
on top of that already offered by the PDA, as well as making it
possible for more women to continue working during pregnancy
through accommodation.1 60 The United States' regime is thus fairly
successful in protecting women during their pregnancy. However, this
protection does not extend past childbirth. The U.S. tradition of atwill employment regimes, in which most employees can be fired at
any time for any reason or no reason at all, offers little protection for
women who find themselves demoted, passed over, or fired after

156.
See Holder, 2011 WL 5361076, at *4 (holding that disability "must be
determined on a case-by-case basis"); Sam-Sekur, 2012 WL 2244325, at *7-8 (finding
that pregnancy and "conditions that arise out of pregnancy" can "qualify as a
disability" in rare situations).
157.
See The Pregnancy DiscriminationAct and the Amended Americans with
Disabilities Act: Working Together to Protect Pregnant Workers, NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW
CTR. 1, 1 (Aug. 2013), [hereinafter Protect Pregnant Workers] http://www.nwlc.org/sites/
default/files/pdfs/pda-adaaa.preg-workers-fact sheet.pdf [http://perma.cc/TQR3-2C9H]
(archived Aug. 31, 2014) (explaining that the combination of the PDA and the ADAAA
"mean[s] that employers must provide reasonable accommodations for many pregnant
workers who need them" because, under the acts, "[a]n employer must make a
reasonable accommodation for a pregnant worker with a pregnancy-related
impairment that rises to the level of a disability . .. [and] make a reasonable
accommodation for a pregnant worker who is limited in her ability to work when the
employer would accommodate a worker with a similar limitation arising out of a
temporary disability").
158.
Temporary disabilities are those that do not meet the traditional definition
of impairment. See id. (noting that "[t]he ADAAA expanded the definition of 'disability'
to include temporary impairments and less severe impairments.. . . [meaning that]
even relatively minor impairments" are included).
159.
See 42. U.S.C. §2000e(k) (providing that "women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employmentrelated purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work" (emphasis added)); Protect Pregnant Workers, supra note 157 ("The
PDA says that pregnant workers must be treated as well as those temporarily disabled
employees.").
160.
See Protect Pregnant Workers, supra note 157 (describing an array of
modified or alternative work assignments employers are required to offer to pregnant
workers).
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returning to work.161 Remedies for this kind of adverse employment
action vary, but the most common are claims for denials of FMLA
leave and gender discrimination under Title VII. 162
In addition to failing to offer paid maternity leave and
postpartum protections for new mothers, the United States also fails
to provide a number of other maternity protections. Unlike Sweden
and a number of other more successful maternity regimes, the United
States has no provision specifically addressing childcare for new
parents. 163 Professor Waldfogel has highlighted the high cost of
private childcare as one of the key failures of both the United States'
and the United Kingdom's maternity protection regimes because of
the added expense of private child care for new parents.164 Moreover,
the United States has no national provision for paid paternity leave,
another key feature of regimes like Sweden's. 165 While fathers as well
as mothers are entitled to take up to twelve weeks of FMLA leave per
year for any reason, only California and New Jersey require that men
be allowed to take six weeks of paid paternity leave, the same as its
requirements for new mothers.1 66 Additionally, the FMLA's general
leave allowances are in no way compulsory.' 67 While the purpose of

Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine
161.
Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 66-68 (2000-2001) (explaining that
the employee at-will doctrine, which gives employers the authority to dismiss
employees at the employer's discretion, had become an integral element of U.S.
employment law as early as 1930).
See John C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, Caregivers in the Courtroom:
162.
the Growing Trend of Family Responsibilities Discrimination,41 U.S.F. L. REV. 171,
185 (2006-2007) (noting that "many employees who have experienced [family
responsibilities discrimination] are using current antidiscrimination laws successfully
to sue their employers"); Joan C. Williams & Consuela A. Pinto, Family
Responsibilities Discrimination: Don't Get Caught Off Guard, 22 LAB. L. 293, 294
(2006-2007) (noting that, in addition to Title VII and the PDA, "plaintiffs attorneys
have found creative and effective ways to prove . . . claims under the FMLA, Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), Equal Pay Act (EPA), and even the employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA)").
See Jane Waldfogel, Understand the "Family Gap" in Pay for Women with
163.
Children, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 137, 140-42,148 (1998) (illustrating that the maternity
protections in the United States lag behind Europe because the United States has not
developed a policy "specifically address[ing] the problems posed by the presence of
children" and instead "relies to a larger extent than most other countries on private
market provision of [child] care").
See id. at 148 ("Both the United States and Britain also rely more
164.
extensively than other countries on private market child care, at a relatively high outof-pocket cost.").
See Mundy, supra note 136; see also infra Part IV (discussing the benefits
165.
of paternity leave).
See Mundy, supra note 136 (noting that "in 2002 California became the first
166.
U.S. state to guarantee six weeks of paid leave for mothers and fathers alike" and
reporting that "Rhode Island and New Jersey have followed suit with four and six paid
weeks, respectively").
FMLA, supra note 123, § 102 (a)(1) (indicating that certain employees are
167.
entitled to, but not required to take, up to twelve weeks of leave each year under
certain circumstances).
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compulsory leave is sometimes suspect, compulsory leave also
alleviates pressure from women to return to work prematurely.16 8
The FMLA's generic provisions offer no protection to women who feel
pressured to return to work without taking their full twelve-week
leave.1 69 In fact, most U.S. women do not take the entire FMLA
period: according to census data, 25 percent of mothers return to
work within two months, while 10 percent return to work in four
weeks or less. 170
2.

The United Kingdom

The United Kingdom offers a second, intermediate level of
maternity protection in the comprehensive Maternity and Parental
Leave Regulations of 1999 (UK Regulations). 171 Employers are
required to provide up to fifty-two weeks of leave, with the first six
weeks paid at 90 percent, a flat rate paid for weeks seven through
thirty-nine, and no pay for weeks forty through fifty-tWo. 172
Employers make these payments, with public funds providing the
employer with 92 percent reimbursement. 173 In accordance with
Regulation 8, new mothers are required to take at least two weeks of
compulsory leave.174 These two weeks begin on the day the child is
born.17 5 Moreover, Regulation 14 allows all male employees up to
thirteen weeks of paid parental leave if he "has, or expects to have,

168.
See Julie C. Suk, From Antidiscriminationto Equality: Stereotypes and the
Life Cycle in the United States and Europe, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 75, 79 (2012) (explaining
that "[t]he purpose [of compulsory maternity leave] is to remove the minimum
standard from employer-employee negotiation in recognition of the ... pressures faced
by employees to agree to terms and conditions that fall below the minimum standard"
such as returning to work early or not taking maternity leave).
169.
See FMLA, supra note 123, § 102(a)(1) (providing that, under certain
circumstances, "an eligible employee shall be entitled to a total of 12 workweeks of
leave during any 12-month period"); Erin Gielow, Note, Equality in the Workplace: Why
Family Leave Does Not Work, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1529, 1532 (2001-2002) (explaining
that women often feel pressured "to choose between staying home with their children
and advancing their careers" and, therefore, return to work before the end of the
twelve-week parental leave period that is permitted under the FMLA).
170.
See Sharon Lerner, Is 40 Weeks the Ideal Maternity Leave Length?, SLATE
(Dec. 22, 2011), http://www.slate.com/articles/double x/doublex/2011/12/maternity
leave how much timeoff is healthiest for babiesand mothers_.html (last visited
Aug. 31, 2014) [http://perma.cc/DFE3-XFSN] (archived Aug. 31, 2014) (citing Ruhm,
ParentalLeave and Child Health, supra note 27) (reporting that "more than a quarter
[of mothers who worked during pregnancy] are at work within two months of giving
birth and one in 10 ... go back to their jobs in four weeks or less").
171.
UK Regulations, supra note 121, at Regulations 4-7 (outlining entitlements
to ordinary and additional maternity leave).
172.
Hurt, Killian & Straley, supra note 111.
173.
See id. (indicating that employer liability provides for maternity leave
compensation and that 92 percent of these payments are "refunded by public funds").
174.
UK Regulations, supra note 121, at Regulation 8.
175.

Id.

2014]

GETTING OFF THE MOMMY TRACK

1491

responsibility for a child."' 76 Regulation 18 additionally provides a
"right to return."1 77 For employees who take leave of four weeks or
less, this is the right to return to their same job in the same position
as they left.' 78 For those who take more than four weeks, employees
are entitled to return to the same position as prior to their leave, "or,
if it is not reasonably practicable for the employer, to another job
the
appropriate ... in
suitable ... and
both
is
which
circumstances."' 7 9 This includes a right to "her seniority, pension
rights and similar rights as they would have been" and "otherwise on
terms and conditions not less favourable than those which would
80
have been applicable to her had she not been absent from work."
Regulation 19 contains specific protection for adverse actions by
employers due to the fact that an employee is pregnant, has given
birth, or has sought to take maternity leave, parental leave, or time
off to care for a child.18 Regulation 20 also offers specific protection
for unfair dismissal on the basis of pregnancy, leave, and childbirth,
including added requirements that employers must make specific
82
showings to support claims of redundancy.
Despite these protections, according to figures reported from the
House of Commons library, on average, nearly "14 percent of the
340,000 women who take maternity leave ... find their [jobs] under
threat when they try to return." 8 3 Nearly half of the women reported
that their job assignments and expectations had changed since
returning from maternity leave, and one in twenty women reported
84
she had taken on a different role within her company.' The report
also showed that, "[i]n 2005, an estimated 30,000 women . .. lost
their jobs as a result of pregnancy discrimination," a staggering "8
85
In addition, the
[percent] of all pregnant women in the workforce."
United Kingdom, like the United States, has a demonstrable
"motherhood penalty," or pay gap between mothers and non-mothers.
According to numbers from the UK Office for National Statistics, in
2009, single women surprisingly earned slightly more than single
men, with a pay gap of -1.1 percent.186 Women who were married or

Id. at Regulations 13-14.
176.
Id. at Regulation 18.
177.
Id. at Regulation 18(1).
178.
Id. at Regulation 18(2).
179.
Id. at Regulation 18(5)(b).
180.
Id. at Regulation 19.
181.
Id. at Regulation 20.
182.
Wright, supranote 23.
183.
Id.
184.
BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND SKILLS COMMITTEE, supra note 24, 1 1.1, 4.2.
185.
Mark Wadsworth, The 'Mothers Versus Everybody Else Pay Gap', YPP
186.
(June 13, 2009), http://markwadsworth.blogspot.com/2009/06/mothers-versus-everybody-elsepay-gap.html (last visited [http://perma.cc/H5ZJ-QRBD] (archived Aug. 31, 2014); see
Tim Worstall, The Mother's Pay Gap, GUARDIAN (U.K.) (June 17, 2009, 6:31 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/jun/17/pay-gap-mothers-children-inequality
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cohabiting, on the other hand, suffered from a 14.5 percent pay gap
with men in comparable positions.' 87 When the numbers were broken
out per child, the gap widened by approximately 5 to 7 percent per
child, beginning with an 8 percent pay gap for women with no
children and ending with a huge 35.5 percent pay gap for women with
four children. 88 Thus, despite the UK Regulations' assurances that
women will return from maternity leave "on terms . . . not less

favourable," 8 9 women are seeing their pay slip with each child.190
These discriminatory practices continue because the UK
Regulations offer absolute job protection only to women who take four
weeks or less of maternity leave;191 they offer no absolute protection
to co-parents who take parental leave or women who take more than
four weeks. 192 Additionally, Regulation 20's unfair dismissal
protections do not apply to employers with five or fewer employees if
it is "not reasonably practicable" for the employer to allow the
employee to return. 19 Given that absolute protection is severely
limited to only four weeks when new mothers are entitled to fifty-two,
these loopholes are large enough to allow for significant abuse. 9 4 In
addition to these enforcement issues, the UK Regulations, like the
U.S. statutes, offer no provision for childcare. 9 5
Perhaps in recognition of these shortcomings, during the
pendency of this Note, Parliament enacted the Children and Families
Act of 2014. In addition to reforming aspects of the family justice
system, adoption process, and special needs education, the Act also
included reforms to the parental leave system.' 9 6 Most significantly,
Part 7 of the Act creates a new right to shared paid parental leave for
[http://perma.cc/H6F8-WC2Q] (archived Aug. 31, 2014) ("[I]t is marriage and more
especially the having of children that leads to what everyone refers to as the gender
pay gap and what should therefore more properly be referred to as the mothers' pay
gap.").
187.
Wadsworth, supra note 186.
188.
For a table, see id.
189.
UK Regulations, supra note 121, at Regulation 18(5)(a).
190.
See Wadsworth, supra note 186 (explaining that the wage "gap widens by
5% - 7%for each child").
191.
UK Regulations, supra note 121, at Regulation 18.
192.
Id. at Regulations 18.
193.
Id. at Regulation 20(6).
194.
See Hurt, Killian & Straley, supra note 111 (indicating that employers offer
employees 52 weeks of maternity leave); UK Regulations, supra note 121 at Regulation
18 (guaranteeing a right to return to the same job for employee's who return from
maternity leave within 4 weeks).
195.
See Waldfogel, supra note 163, at 148 (noting that "Britain ... has very
little in the way of family policy" and 'lags behind the rest of Europe in child care
provision"); see generally UK Regulations, supra note 121 (providing parental leave for
parents but failing to provide for parental care).
196.
For a summary of the changes in law under the Act, see Press Release,
Dep't for Educ., Landmark Children and Families Act 2014 Gains Royal Assent (Mar.
13, 2014) [hereinafter Press Release], available at https://www.gov.uk/government/
news/landmark-children-and-families-act-2014-gains-royal-assent (last visited Oct. 11,
2014) [http://perma.cc/A7TF-PF72] (archived Oct. 23, 2014).
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all eligible parents beginning in April 2015.197 Under the new Act,
mothers continue to be eligible for leave as before.' 9 8 However, if
mothers decide not to take their entire fifty-two week allowance,
fathers and co-parents have a right to share in the remaining leave
for up to fifty weeks of leave and thirty-seven weeks of pay.19 9 This is
a potential increase over the UK Regulations' provision of up to
thirteen weeks for new fathers. 200 The Act also provides a new right
for fathers and co-parents (including same-sex partners) and intended
parents (in the case of surrogacy) to take unpaid time off work to
attend prenatal appointments with pregnant women beginning in
October 2014.201 Finally, the Act closes some of the loopholes that
allowed employers to continue discriminatory policies by expanding
the right to a flexible work schedule to all caregivers and providing
that employers have a duty to "deal with the application in a
reasonable manner." 202
The passage of the Children and Families Act demonstrates that
the time is ripe for new parental leave protections. 203 It also enacted
many of the reforms advocated in the proposed Global Maternity
Protection Act, detailed in Part IV, including the equal provision of
leave benefits to mothers and co-parents and decreased employer

Children and Families Act, 2014, c. 6, pt. 7 (U.K.), available at
197.
http://www.legislation,gov.uk/ukpga/2014/6/part/7/enacted (2014) (last visited Oct. 11,
2014) [http://perma.cc/8P23-SVP8] (archived Oct. 23, 2014).
See Press Release, supra note 196 ("All employed women continue to be
198.
eligible for maternity leave and statutory maternity pay or allowance in the same way
as previously.").
See Children and Families Act, supra note 197, § 75F(2)(a)(i) ("[T]he
199.
amount of leave to which an employee is entitled in respect of a child does not
exceed . .. in a case where the child's mother became entitled to maternity leave, the
relevant amount of time reduced by .. . the amount of maternity leave taken by the
child's mother[.]"); Press Release, supra note 196 ("[I]f [mothers] choose to bring their
leave and pay or allowance to an early end, eligible working parents can share the
balance of the remaining leave and pay as shared parental leave and pay up to a total
of 50 weeks of leave and 37 weeks of pay.").
See UK Regulations, supra note 121, at Regulations 13-14 (providing for up
200.
to thirteen weeks of parental leave for co-parents); Regulation 18 (offering no
protection for co-parents who take parental leave).
See Children and Families Act, supra note 197, pt. 8, § 57ZE(1) ("An
201.
employee who has a qualifying relationship with a pregnant woman or her expected
child is entitled to be permitted by his or her employer to take time off during the
employee's working hours in order that he or she may accompany the woman when she
attends by appointment at any place for the purpose of receiving ante-natal care.").
See Press Release, supra note 196 ("Part 9 provides for the expansion of the
202.
right to request flexible working from employees who are parents or carers to all
employees, and the removal of the statutory process that employers must currently
follow when considering requests for flexible working."); Children and Families Act,
supra note 197, pt. 9, § 132(2).
See Press Release, supra note 196 (quoting Employment Relations Minister
203.
Jenny Willott as saying, "Current workplace arrangements have not kept up with the
times. The Children and Families Act will bring the way new parents balance their
working and home lives into the 21st century.").
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discretion in making decisions related to leave benefits. Thus, while
the Children and Families Act does not solve all of the issues with the
UK's maternity protection regime, it is a step forward.
3.

Sweden

Sweden has perhaps the world's most progressive maternity
leave system. 204 The Parental Leave Act of 1995 (Act) is unique in
that it provides for five different types of paid parental leave. 20 5
Under the second type of leave, parents are entitled to up to 480 full
days of paid parental leave. 206 Of those 480 days, sixty days are
reserved for the co-parent. 207 Parents are compensated at a rate of 80
percent of their original salary for the first 390 days of leave, and
then compensated at a flat fee for the remaining ninety days. 208 All
expenses are paid by social security.20 9 Additionally, parents can
choose to take full leave for a shorter period of time, 210 reduce their
normal working hours in order to extend their leave benefits until the
child is up to eight years old, 211 or take temporary leave with
temporary benefits for short periods of time. 2 12 The Act mandates two
weeks of compulsory leave 213 and entitles every woman to a minimum
of seven weeks of leave pre-delivery and seven weeks post-delivery.2 1 4
These benefits are extended beyond married mothers and fathers to

204.
See Hurt, Killian & Straley, supra note 111 ("Sweden and Norway have
among the best parental leave in the world.").
205.
See Parental Leave Act, supra note 122, § 3 (listing the five types of
parental leave provided by the Act).
206.
See id. § 3, 2 (providing that a parent may take "[flull leave ... until the
child has reached 18 months"); Gender and Equality in Sweden, supra note 122
(explaining that "parents are entitled to 480 days of parental leave" and describing the
parental allowance); Hurt, Killian & Straley, supra note 111 (indicating the availability
of parental leave in Sweden).
207.
See Hurt, Killian & Straley, supra note 111 (noting that "[t]wo months are
reserved for the father").
208.
Id.
209.
See id. (indicating that compensation during maternity leave is paid by
social security).
210.
See Parental Leave Act, supra note 122, §§ 4, 10-11, 15 (stipulating that
"[m]aternity leave need not be taken in conjunction with the payment of parental
benefit," describing how periods of leave can be distributed, and recognizing an
employee's "right to resume work" prior to the end of his or her intended parental
leave).
211.
See id. §§ 6-7 (stating the policies for partial leave with and without
parental benefit).
212.
See id. § 8 (identifying the circumstances under which an employee is
entitled to temporary leave to care for his or her child).
213.
See id. § 4 ("[T]wo weeks of this maternity leave shall be obligatory during
the period prior to or after delivery.").
214.
See id. § 4 ("A female employee is entitled to a full leave in connection with
her child's birth during a continuous period of at least seven weeks prior to the
estimated time for delivery and seven weeks after the delivery.").
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legal custodians and those who have "taken a child for permanent
care and fosterage."2 15
Sections 16 and 17, under the heading "Prohibition of
Disfavourable Treatment," offer discrimination protections for
employees who take parental leave under the Act. 2 16 Section 16
provides that "employers may not disfavor a job applicant or an
employee for reasons related to parental leave" when deciding an
employment issue, considering promotions, implementing vocational
training or counseling, determining pay or terms of employment,
managing and distributing work, or deciding terminations. 217
However, Section 16 contains a potentially wide exception: "[T]his
prohibition does not apply if the different terms and conditions or
different treatment are a necessary consequence of the leave." 218
Section 17, on the other hand, gives a broad and absolute protection
from termination: "If an employee is given notice of termination or is
summarily dismissed solely for reasons related to parental leave
under this Act, the notice of termination or summarily dismissal shall
be declared invalid, if the employee so requests." 21 9
The Act has been widely successful in addressing maternity
issues in Sweden. Women's labor force participation rates in Sweden
are much higher than either the United States or United Kingdom: in
2005, Sweden female workforce participation rate was the highest of
any OECD country at 84.6 percent of women age twenty-five to fortyfour (those most likely to have young children), compared to
approximately 75 percent and 74 percent, respectively, for the United
States and UK over the same period. 220 The overall gender pay gap in
Sweden for full-time employees (not adjusted for familial status) is
lower than either the United States or UK, at approximately 15
percent versus approximately 22 percent for the United States and 20
percent for the UK.22 1 Some commentators have stated that, unlike

215.
Id. § 1.
216.
See id. §§ 16-17 (prohibiting employers from disfavoring job applicants and
employees for a series of reasons and declaring a termination or dismissal for any of
the prohibited reasons invalid at the employees request).
217.
See id. § 16 (listing seven reasons employers may not use as grounds for
disfavoring job applicants or employees).
218.
Id.
219.
Id. § 17.
220.
See Joanna Abhayaratna & Ralph Lattimore, Workforce ParticipationRates
- How Does Australia Compare? 69 tbl.A.9 (Australian Gov't Productivity Comm'n,
Staff Working Paper, 2006), available at http://www.pc.gov.aul datalassets/pdf -file/
0008/60479/workforceparticipation.pdf [http://perma.cc/3RRM-UTCD] (archived Aug.
29, 2014) (listing the "[a]djusted female workforce participation rates by age groups"
for 2005 in OECD nations).
221.
See DEREK BLADES, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., WOMEN AND
MEN IN OECD COUNTRIES 15 (2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/std/37962502.pdf
[http://perma.ccl78JX-JHAU] (archived Sept. 12, 2014) (charting the gender wage gaps
of OECD nations in 2004 or, alternatively, the most recently available year).
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the United States and UK, Sweden has no motherhood penalty. 222
However, 2011 OECD numbers show that the gender pay gap for
single women in Sweden is higher than in either the United States or
UK, at 14 percent, with an additional 7 percent motherhood penalty
for women with at least one child. 2 2 3 According to the OECD, women
in Sweden are also less represented in senior management than
women in either the United States or UK. 224
Commentators generally agree that Sweden's program has been
successful in maintaining women's labor market participation rate,
something other countries have been unable to do. 225 This is
generally attributed to Sweden's childcare provisions, including both
parental leave and state-sponsored preschool and after-school
programs. 226 However, the conflicting numbers about gender pay
gaps and the motherhood penalty are troubling. Commentators,
including the OECD itself, have suggested that Sweden's long
parental leave periods are actually causing this gap rather than
helping it.22 7 There are variety of potential theories for this paradox,
including that women are allowed more parental leave than men,

222.
See Waldfogel, supra note 163, at 143, 148 (explaining that women with
children in both the United States and UK incur a pay penalty compared to their childfree counterparts while working mothers in Sweden experience no such pay penalty).
223.
The disparity in these numbers is likely due to changes in metrics: The
OECD figure measures general employment numbers, including women working in all
fields and both full-time and part-time workers, while the earlier cited figures include
only full-time workers. Additionally, the numbers are likely impacted by the difference
in market sectors for men and women: the majority of women in Sweden work in the
public or service sectors, where wages are generally lower than in the private sector
and where there is less room for advancement. See Closing the Gender Gap, supra note
108 (describing the differences in male and female employment and pay in Sweden).
224.
See id. (charting the percentage of women in OECD nations holding
positions as part of the labor force and as senior managers).
225.
See, e.g., Abhayaratna & Lattimore, supra note 220, at 29 fig.3.5 (showing
Sweden maintains the highest female workforce participation rate relative to the other
documented nations).
See Closing the Gender Gap, supra note 108 ("Sweden has invested in a
226.
continuum of work-family supports for families throughout early and middle childhood
(including parental leave, pre-school and out-of-school hours care).").
See id. (highlighting the disparities between Swedish men and women's pay
227.
and positions of relative power in the workforce); Kay Hymowitz, Longer Maternity
Leave Not So Great for Women After All, TIME (Sept. 30, 2013), http://ideas.time.com/
2013/09/30/longer-maternity-leave-not-so-great-for-women-after-all/ [http://perma.cc/
B2PS-6VYA] (archived Aug. 29, 2014) ("Rather than offering a route to equality
between the sexes, the data shows, extended maternity leave actually throws up
roadblocks in a woman's career - the very roadblocks that such policies are meant to
prevent."); Lerner, supra note 170 (noting generally that "certain amounts of leave may
give the biggest bang, while longer periods of leave may yield diminishing returns, at
best"); Th6venon, supra note 30, $1 68-70 (explaining that "the effect on female
employment and the gender gap of lengthening the period of paid leave turns from
positive to negative for durations of leave exceeding two years"); We Did It!, supra note
108 (noting that needing to provide lengthy periods of maternity leave deters private
firms from hiring women, explaining why most Swedish women occupy lower paying
government positions).
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thus taking women out of the workforce for longer, 228 that the
prospect of having to provide long parental leave- discourages hiring
women, 229 and that women who are out of work for so long inevitably
fall behind. 230
B. InternationalEfforts
As mentioned in Part II.A, above, gender equality has long been
a focus of the international community. As part of that effort, the
United Nations and its bodies have enacted a number of conventions
aimed at promoting gender equality, including protecting women's
employment. 231 Part III.B examines three conventions that deal
specifically with maternity discrimination: The Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination of 1979 (CEDAW) and the
1999 CEDAW Optional Protocol, the Workers with Family
Responsibilities Convention of 1981 (WFRC), and the Maternity
Protection Convention of 2000 (MPC). Because of the weak
enforcement capabilities of the WFRC, this Note focuses on CEDAW
and the MPC.
1.

The Convention on
Discrimination of 1979

the

Elimination

of

all

Forms

of

The UN General Assembly adopted CEDAW in 1979. 232
Colloquially referred to as the Women's Bill of Rights, CEDAW has
188 parties and ninety-nine signatories. 2 33 Article 11(2) addresses
"discrimination against women on the grounds of marriage or
maternity and [ensuring] their effective right to work." 234 Section (a)
228.
See Closing the Gender Gap, supra note 108 (noting that only "13% of
available parental leave (8.5 weeks) is reserved to fathers" in Sweden).
229.
See We Did It!, supra note 108 ("Lengthy periods of maternity leave can put
firms off hiring women, which helps explain why most Swedish women work in the
public sector and Sweden has a lower proportion of women in management than
America does.").
230.
See Th6venon, supra note 30, 1 68-69 (articulating that, beyond a certain
point, prolonged leave increases the gender employment gap and negatively affects
women's employment).
231.
See, e.g., CEDAW, supra note 35; International Labour Organization,
Convention No. 156 Convention concerning Equal Opportunities and Equal Treatment
for Men and Women Workers: Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention, June
23, 1981, 1331 U.N.T.S. 22346 [hereinafter WFRC]; International Labour
Organization, Convention No. 183 Concerning the Revision of the Maternity Protection
Convention (revised), June 15, 2000, 2181 U.N.T.S. 38441 [hereinafter MPC].
232.
CEDAW, supra note 35, at 1.
233.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women: Ratifications, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, available at https://treaties
.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg no=iv-8&chapter=4&lang=en [http://
perma.cc/33TN-TSRB?type=source] (archived Aug. 30, 2014) [hereinafter CEDAW
Ratifications].
234.
CEDAW, supra note 35, art. 11(2).
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prohibits "dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy or of maternity
leave." 235 Section (b) requires member states "[flt]o introduce
maternity leave with pay or with comparable social benefits without
loss of former employment, seniority or social allowances." 23 6 Many of
the reservations to the CEDAW concern Article 11(2).237 For example,
prior to the implementation of their current paid maternity leave
system,23 8 Australia advised that: "[I]t is not at present in a position
to take the measures required by [A]rticle 11(2) to introduce
maternity leave with pay or with comparable social benefits
throughout Australia." 239 Austria, Ireland, Malaysia, Malta,
Micronesia, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Singapore, and Germany
also made some type of reservation regarding Article 11(2).240 While
many of these reservations have since been withdrawn (and all the
states mentioned have in fact enacted paid maternity leave policies),
the discord on this issue highlights that important role it played in
CEDAW.
Article 29 of CEDAW permits one state to enforce the convention
against another through arbitration and, if arbitration is not possible,
through appeal to the International Court of Justice. 24 1 However, this
enforcement mechanism is subject to a number of reservations and
has never been utilized. 24 2 In response to a call for an enforcement
mechanism with more teeth, the CEDAW Committee proposed the
Optional Protocol. 243 The Optional Protocol to CEDAW was adopted
by the UN General Assembly in October 1999 and has 105 parties. 24 4
This is noticeably less than the 188 parties to CEDAW itself.245

235.
Id. art. 11(2)(a).
236.
Id. art. 11(2)(b).
237.
See CEDAW Ratifications, supra note 233, at 3-49 (listing signatory and
party nations' reservations and objections to CEDAW).
238.
See Hurt, Killian & Straley, supra note 111 (discussing Australia's
duration, compensation rate, and source of compensation for Australia's parental leave
policy in 2011).
239.
CEDAW Ratifications, supra note 233, at 1, 49 n.3.
240.
See id. 4-9, 11 (articulating each nation's reservations to various provisions
of CEDAW, including those related to Article 11(2)).
241.
See CEDAW, supra note 35, art. 29 (providing that a dispute between two
or more nations regarding the interpretation or application of the Convention not
settled by negotiation may be submitted to arbitration by request, and, if not settled
within six months of the request, "any one of those parties may refer the dispute to the
International Court of Justice").
242.
See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discriminationagainst
Women: Why an Optional Protocol?, UN WOMEN, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/
daw/cedaw/protocollwhy.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2014) [http://perma.cc/6S7K-FMEQ]
(archived Aug. 29, 2014) [hereinafter Why an Optional Protocol?] (indicating that no
state party has ever referred an interpretation or implementation dispute under article
29 of CEDAW and that the "procedure is subject to a large number of reservations").
243.
See G.A. Res. 54/4, at 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/4 (Oct. 15, 1999)
[hereinafter Optional Protocol] (identifying the actions prompting the Resolution).
244.
See id. at 1 (providing the date of ratification via the General Assembly
Resolution); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
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Article 2 of the Protocol allows any individual or group within
the jurisdiction of a member state who claims to be a victim of a
violation of any of the rights set out in CEDAW to submit a
complaint, called a "communication," to the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. 246 The Committee
operates essentially as a court. It recognizes precedent in reviewing
communications and will not admit communications when the issue
presented has already been settled or is already under review. 247 In
the event of a decision against a State Party, the Committee makes
recommendations for correction. 248 The Committee is moreover
authorized under Article 8 to investigate any alleged "grave or
systematic violations" of CEDAW by member states. 249 The Protocol
concludes by requiring member states to "undertake[] to make widely
known and to give publicity to the Convention and the present
Protocol" in order to encourage communications. 250
Unlike CEDAW Article 29, the Protocol has been successful in
addressing at least a few complaints. The Committee completed its
first and only Article 8 inquiry to date in July 2004. 251 "The
Committee [also] adopted its first decision on a[] communication
submitted under article 2 .. . in July 2004."252 Since then, it has
adopted ten other decisions.2 53 The third decision by the Committee
Women: Optional Protocol Ratification, Oct. 6, 1999, 2131 U.N.T.S. 83 [hereinafter
CEDAW Optional Protocol Ratifications], available at https://treaties.un.org/
[http://perma.cc/
doc/Publication/MTDSGNolume%201/Chapter%201V/IV-8-b.en.pdf
3FP2-8CZU] (archived Aug. 30, 2014) (noting that there are 105 parties to the CEDAW
Optional Protocol and that the protocol was ratified on October 6, 1999).
245.
See CEDAW Ratifications, supra note 233 (indicating that there are 188
parties to CEDAW).
See Optional Protocol, supra note 243, art. 2 ("Communications may be
246.
submitted by or on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals, under the jurisdiction
of a State Party, claiming to be victims of a violation of any of the rights set forth in the
Convention by that State Party.").
247.
See id. art. 4(2)(a) (stating that the Committee will not consider a
communication when "[t]he same matter has already been examined by the Committee
or has been or is being examined under another procedure of international
investigation or settlement").
Id. art. 7(3)-(5) (explaining the State Party is required to respond to a
248.
recommendation within six months and may be asked to give reports about "any
measures the State Party has taken in response to [the Committee's] views or
recommendations" in the State Party's subsequent annual reports to the Committee).
See id. art. 8(1)-(2) (noting that the Committee, in response to receipt of
249.
"reliable information indicating grave or systematic violations of the Convention," may
request information from the accused state or "designate one or more of its members to
conduct an inquiry and to report ... to the Committee").
250.
Id. art. 13.
251.
See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discriminationagainst
Women: Decisions/ Views, UN WOMEN, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/
(archived Aug. 30, 2014)
[http://perma.cc/MB3P-QV9R]
protocol/dec-views.htm
[hereinafter CEDAW Decisions/Views] (listing only one inquiry conducted under Article
8 of the Optional Protocol and noting that the inquiry was completed in July 2004).
252.
Id.
253.
See id. (listing ten decisions on inquiries made under Article 2).
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concerned Article 11(2) of CEDAW. 254 A Dutch woman claimed the
Netherlands' compensation scheme for self-employed women, which
did not provide full compensation of her previous salary, was a
violation of Article 11(2)(b)'s requirement that national legislation
must provide women "with pay or with comparable social benefits
without loss of former employment, seniority or social allowances." 25 5
The Committee rejected her claim, holding that Article 11(2)(b) left a
"margin of discretion" for member states to fulfill the convention's
requirements through national legislation and that the Netherlands'
scheme was within that margin of discretion. 256
CEDAW Article 11(2) is an important international instrument
for fighting maternity discrimination. CEDAW is one of the most
ratified treaties in history, with only six less parties than the
Convention on the Rights of the Child. 257 Thus, Article 11(2)'s
requirements have the potential to be far-reaching in their protection
of women. Importantly, CEDAW's Article 11 employment
requirements are supported by the remainder of CEDAW's gender
discrimination provisions, providing the extra protections that are
necessary to the support of a maternity protection regime. 258
However, CEDAW is subject to many reservations, depends on selfreporting even for those states that are supposedly bound by it, and
lacks significant penalties even for members that are found to be in
violation. 259 That not a single action has ever been submitted to the
Committee through Article 29 is proof positive of its failure in

254.
See id. (listing Dung Thi Thuy Nguyen us. Netherlands as the Committee's
third decision); CEDAW, Dung Thi Thuy Nguyen v. Netherlands, Comm. No. 3/2004,
1.1, CEDAW/C/36/D/3/2004 (Aug. 26, 2006) [hereinafter Netherlands Case], available
at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/decisions-views/Decision%2032004%20-%2oEnglish.pdf [http://perma.cc/BG53-ZZV3] (archived Aug. 29, 2014)
(raising a claim based on Article 11, paragraph 2(b)).
255.
CEDAW, supranote 35, art. 11(2)(b); see also Netherlands Case, supra note
254, TT 3.1-3.5 (outlining Nguyen's claim that the Netherlands violated Article 11,
paragraph 2(b) of CEDAW).
Netherlands Case, supra note 254, T$ 10.2-10.3.
256.
See Convention on the Rights of the Child Ratifications, Nov. 20, 1989,
257.
1577 U.N.T.S. 3, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg
no=IV- 1 1&chapter=4&lang-en [http://perma.cc/42K7-WZYU] (archived Aug. 29, 2014)
(indicating that, as of August 29, 2014, the Convention on the Rights of the Child has
194 parties).
See generally CEDAW, supra note 35 (establishing numerous provisions
258.
designed to eliminate gender discrimination and better protect women's rights in all
spheres).
259.
See Felipe G6mez Isa, The Optional Protocol for the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Strengthening the
Protection Mechanisms of Women's Human Rights, 20 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 291,
302-05 (2003) (discussing a variety of weaknesses that make the CEDAW an
ineffective mechanism for protecting women's rights).
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enforcement. 260 Given this dismal record, the Optional Protocol is an
encouraging addition to CEDAW. Through the Netherlands case, the
Protocol has already proven its potential utility in addressing
maternity discrimination. 261 However, the Protocol has only 105
parties and eighty signatories, much less than CEDAW. 262 Like
CEDAW itself, the Protocol is also limited to actions submitted
against member states, 263 limiting its power. Even under the
Protocol, Committee decisions are enforced only through
"recommendations" to state parties. 264 Thus, even decisions reached
through the Committee correspondence mechanism of the Protocol
have little value for actually enforcing the substantive rights of
CEDAW, not to mention the "margin of discretion" the Committee
found Article 11(2) leaves to parties. 2 65
In sum, CEDAW, through the use of the Optional Protocol, has
the potential to be an effective tool for international maternity
protection. However, the limitations on the Committee's sanction
power and the number of states subject to the Protocol cripple its
effectiveness on a global scale.
2.

Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention of 1981

Another international instrument that addresses maternity and
employment is the Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention
of 1981. 266 This Convention has forty-three ratifications. 267 The
preamble recognizes "the need to create effective equality of
opportunity and treatment as between men and women workers with
family responsibilities and between such workers and other

See Why an Optional Protocol?,supra note 242 (noting that no state party
260.
has ever referred an interpretation or implementation dispute under Article 29 of
CEDAW).
261.
See Netherlands Case, supra nate 254,
10.2-10.3 (showing that, while
the specifics of this case did not merit action, the Optional Protocol does provide a
functional framework for furthering the goals of CEDAW).
262.
Compare CEDAW Optional Protocol Ratifications, supra note 244
(indicating that the Optional Protocol has 105 signatories and 80 parties), with
CEDAW Ratifications, supra note 233 (noting that CEDAW has 188 parties and 99
signatories).
263.
See Optional
Protocol, supra note
243, art. 2 (stating that
"[c]ommunications may be submitted by or on behalf of individuals or groups of
individuals").
264.
Id. art. 7-8.
265.
See Netherlands Case, supra note 254, T 10.2 (explaining that, under
CEDAW, States have a "margin of discretion to devise a system of maternity leave
benefits to fulfill Convention requirements").
See generally WFRC, supra note 231.
266.
267.
Ratifications of C156 - Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention,
1981 (No. 156), INT'L LAB. ORG., http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/fp=1000:11300:0
::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENTID:312301 (last visited Aug. 31, 2014) [http://
perma.cclLZS9-429E] (archived Aug. 31, 2014).
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workers." 26 8 Article 3 requires member states to "make it an aim of
national policy to enable persons with family responsibilities who are
engaged or wish to engage in employment to exercise their right to do
so without being subject to discrimination and, to the extent possible,
without conflict between their employment
and family
responsibilities." 269 The conditional, deferential, tone of these
provisions stands in contrast to the commanding tone of CEDAW's
requirements. The WFRC's most striking provision, Article 8,
provides simply, "[flamily responsibilities shall not, as such,
constitute a valid reason for termination of employment." 270
The WFRC has the benefit of being adopted by a meaningful
number of countries. 271 However, it provides no real enforcement
mechanism. 2 72 Instead, by the ILO's own description, the WFRC's
main purpose is simply "to promote equality."27 3 Ratifications are
seen as a "message in support of the special needs and problems that
workers with family responsibilities face" rather than a commitment
to any new or additional legal responsibilities for member states. 274
Moreover, the WRFC speaks directly to maternity very little.2 75 These
structural problems make the WFRC a poor mechanism for
international maternity protection.
3.

Maternity Protection Convention of 2000

The most progressive international instrument that addresses
maternity is the International Labour Organization's Maternity
Protection Convention of 2000.276 This 2000 convention revised the

268.
WFRC, supra note 231, pmbl.
269.
Id. § 3.
270.
Id. § 8.
271.
See Ratifications of C156, supra note 267 (listing the 43 countries that have
ratified the WFRC).
272.
See WFRC, supra note 231, art. 9 (failing to specify an enforcement
mechanism and providing that enforcement can be achieved through the "laws or
regulations, collective agreements, works rules, arbitration awards, court decisions or a
combination of these methods, or in any other manner consistent with national practice
which may be appropriate").
273.
Ecuador Ratifies the Workers with FamilyResponsibilities Convention, ILO
(Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/WCMS 204817/lang--enlindex.htm
(last visited Aug. 31, 2014) [http://perma.cc/A8YC-7X6E] (archived Aug. 31, 2014) ("The
Convention aims to promote equality of opportunity and treatment in employment of
men and women workers with family responsibilities, as well as between workers with
family responsibilities and those without such responsibilities.").
274.
Id.
275.
See WFRC, supra note 231 (referring to "family responsibilities" but never
maternity issues explicitly).
276.
MPC, supra note 231; see also International Labour Standards on
Maternity Protection,ILO, http://ilo.org/global/standards/subjects-covered-by-internationallabour-standards/maternity-protection/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2014)
[http://perma.cc/R27H-9RUC] (archived Oct. 23, 2014) (defining the convention as "the
most up-to-date international labour standard on maternity protection").
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less forceful Maternity Protection Convention of 1952. 277 The
convention has twenty-nine ratifications.2 78 The Preamble states that
the MPC's purpose is to create an international convention
specifically providing for the protection of female workers in the
circumstance of pregnancy. 279 Thus, it is the only international
conventions whose sole aim is to protect maternity and
employment.2 80 Article 4 is entitled "Maternity Leave" and provides
(1) that women in member states will "be entitled to a period of
maternity leave of not less than fourteen weeks" and (2) that member
28 1
states will require "six weeks' compulsory leave after childbirth."
Article 4(2) requires that each member state accompany their
ratification with a separate declaration specifying the period of
maternity leave they will offer, not less than fourteen weeks, as
specified in Article 4(1). 282 The section of the convention titled
"Benefits" is the largest of the entire instrument and contains
Articles 6 and 7.283 Article 7 provides specifically for underdeveloped

See MPC, supra note 231, pmbl. The Maternity Protection Conventions of
277.
1952 and 1919 are still in force for some states, including some that are not parties to
the 2000 Convention. See Ratificationsof C003 - Maternity Protection Convention, 1919
(No. 3), ILO, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/fPp=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300
INSTRUMENTID:312148 (last visited Oct. 23, 2014) [http://perma.cclJ548-M8WR]
(archived Oct. 23, 2014) (listing twenty-six states for whom the convention is still in
force); Ratifications of C103 - Maternity Protection Convention (Revised), 1952 (No.
103), ILO, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/fp=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300
INSTRUMENTID:312248 (last visited Oct. 23, 2014) [http://perma.cclRH6R-RRY8]
(archived Oct. 23, 2014) (listing twenty-four states for whom the convention is still in
force). The 1919 Convention specifies that a woman "shall not be permitted to work
during the six weeks following her confinement" and shall "be paid benefits sufficient
for full and healthy maintenance of herself and her child . .. and .. . shall be entitled to
free attendance by a doctor or certified midwife" but allows for women to be dismissed
if she remains absent for longer than six weeks or develops an illness related to
pregnancy "rendering her unfit for work." See 1919 MPC, supra note 92, arts. 3(a), 3(c),
4. Similarly, the 1952 Convention provides for a period of maternity of at least twelve
weeks, with at least six weeks of mandatory leave and "cash and medical benefits" but
allows for women on maternity leave to be dismissed during her absence. See 1952
MPC supranote 93, arts. 3(2)-(3), 4(1), 6.
Ratifications of C183 - Maternity Protection Convention, 2000 (No. 183), ILO,
278.
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB: 11300:0::NO::P1 1300_INSTRU
MENTID:312328 (last visited Aug. 31, 2014) [http://perma.cc/3K8N-SEDU] (archived
Aug. 31, 2014).
See MPC, supra note 231, pmbl. (indicating that the Convention is meant to
279.
"promote equality of all women in the workforce").
See List of Instruments By Subject and Status, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/
280.
normlex/en/fp=1000:12030:0::NO:::#Maternity-protection (last visited Oct. 11, 2014)
[http://perma.cc/LP9H-4ZQE] (archived Oct. 23, 2014) (listing the MPC as the only upto-date instrument on maternity protection).
MPC, supra note 231, art. 4.
281.
See id. ("The length of the period of leave referred to [in Article 4(1)] shall
282.
be specified by each Member in a declaration accompanying its ratification of this
Convention."). Declarations accompanying the ratifications can be seen at MPC
Ratifications, supra note 278.
See MPC, supra note 231, arts. 6, 7 (discussing the benefits provided under
283.
the MPC).
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countries, allowing a lower bar for compliance than required in
Article 6.284 Article 6 is the heart of the maternity leave protections in
the convention. It provides for three main benefits: (1) cash benefits
for women with traditional employment following childbirth or
complications from childbirth, (2) cash benefits for women who do not
get traditional earnings following childbirth, and (3) medical benefits
for women and children.2 85
The MPC's major benefit is that it is focused solely on protecting
women during pregnancy and after child birth. Another benefit is its
guaranteed enforcement mechanism: by requiring that members
provide proof of their compliance with the convention at the time of
accession, MPC secures its own enforcement without any of the
problems faced by the CEDAW Committee. 286 However, the MPC has
only twenty-nine signatories, making its reach limited.2 87 Moreover,
many countries already provide many of the protections in the MPC,
such as compulsory and discretionary leave periods, benefits, and
medical care, through domestic law. 288 Not only does this make the
adoption of MPC less vital for these states, but also, as discussed in
Part A, these domestic efforts have not been successful at achieving
full workplace equality and maternity protection, thus limiting the
MPC's potential as a fix-all solution.

IV. SOLUTION

Maternity discrimination in employment is an international
problem that has be dealt with in a variety of ways. From this survey,

284.
Compare MPC, supra note 231, art. 6(2) (requiring that "[c]ash
benefits. . . be at a level which ensures that the woman can maintain herself and her
child in proper conditions of health and with a suitable standard of living"), with id.
art. 7(1) (requiring "[a] Member whose economy and social security system are
insufficiently developed . . . be deemed to be in compliance . . . if cash benefits are

provided at a rate no lower than a rate payable for sickness or temporary disability in
accordance with national laws and regulations").
285.
See MPC, supra note 231, art. 6(1)-(2), (6)-(7) (indicating that "[c]ash
benefits shall be provided to women who are absent from work on leave" and to women
who "do[ not meet the conditions to qualify for cash benefits under national laws" and
that "[m]edical benefits shall be provided for the woman and her child").
286.
See id. art. 2(3) (requiring each member to include a "list [of] the categories
of workers . . . excluded and the reasons for their exclusion" and a description of
"measures taken with a few to progressively extending the provision of the Convention"
in the member's report required "under article 22 of the Constitution of the
International Labour Oranization"); see also ILO Constitution, art. 22, available at
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f9p=1000:62:0::NO:62:P62_LISTENTRIEID:24539
07:NO#A22 (last visited Sept. 19, 2014) [http://perma.cc/3TRZ-K3T7] (archived Sept.
19, 2014) (requiring members "to make an annual report ... on the measures which it
has taken to give effect to the provisions of Conventions to which it is a party").
287.
MPC Ratifications, supra note 278.
288.
See MPA Ratifications, supra note 278; WORLD POLICY ANALYSIS, supra
note 26 (showing maternity leave policies around the world).
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a few things should have become clear. First, none of the solutions
currently in force presents a holistic solution to the problems of
maternity discrimination; none address gender discrimination,
health, and economic issues at once. Second, paid maternity leave,
the keystone of the majority of solutions both domestic and
international, is not a stand-alone solution. This is in part because
paid maternity leave-the original maternity protection-was not
devised to solve problems with gender or economic inequality but
rather was based in a paternalistic desire to protect the health of
children of working mothers. Third, international conventions, while
addressing the issues and showing some benefit for member states,
do not have the reach or authority to adequately solve the problems of
maternity discrimination. Finally, piecemeal domestic solutions have
had the most success in addressing individual problems caused by
maternity discrimination.
Inspired by the passage of maternity protection legislation in the
United States through the federal system, this Note proposes a global
solution through domestic efforts. The Global Maternity Protection
Act is an international model law for maternity protection that can be
adopted on a state-by-state basis.
A. Note on the Difficulty of InternationalSolutions
Given the survey of international instruments above,
particularly CEDAW and the MPC, adoption of international
instruments is certainly a worthy goal. As the ILO has recognized,
the significance of adoption of these conventions is often as simple
and profound as a public, global commitment to gender equality and
nondiscrimination. 289 Therefore, adoption should certainly be
encouraged wherever possible. However, there are two reasons these
instruments cannot, in and of themselves, fully address the problem
of global maternity discrimination.
First, some states may be reluctant to ratify international
instruments. The experience of the United States is a prime example
of this mindset. 290 This reluctance often depends on the place treaties
hold under domestic law. In the United States, for example, under
Ecuador Ratifies the Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention,
289.
supra note 273 ("Ecuador's ratification of [CEDAW] sends a renewed message in
support of the special needs and problems that workers with family responsibilities
face.").
See Blanchfield, supra note 134, at 1, 8 (explaining that U.S. ratification of
290.
CEDAW has been delayed because of the "concern[] that ... ratification would
undermine national sovereignty and require the federal government or, worse, the
United Nations to interfere in the private conduct of citizens"); Harold H. Koh, Why
America Should Ratify the Women's Rights Treaty (CEDAW), 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 263, 273 (2012) (summarizing the arguments against ratification, including, "most
pervasively, ... that U.S. ratification would diminish our national sovereignty and
states' rights by superseding or overriding our national, state or local laws.").
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Article 6 of the United States Constitution, treaties are "the supreme
Law of the Land," entitled to the same legal weight as federal statute
or the Constitution itself.291 A treaty thus displaces all domestic law
contrary to its terms just as a finding on unconstitutionality or
preemption would.29 2 The U.S. Senate has historically been loath to
give an international instrument that has not been tested by the U.S.
political process such heavy weight. 293 In recent years, the Senate has
been willing to adopt treaties dealing with international issues such
as global economics and criminal extradition but remains ambivalent
to human rights treaties such as CEDAW. 294 The United States
signed CEDAW in July 1980 but never allowed the treaty to come
into force in the United States. 295 Similarly, the United States signed
the Declaration on the Rights of the Child in February 1995, only to
become one of only three countries in the world not to ratify. 296 In
countries that are hesitant to ratify treaties or that take many

291.
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
292.
See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S. PRT. 106-7, TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 4 (2001),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-106SPRT66922/pdflCPRT-106SPRT
66922.pdf [http://perma.cc/52YH-6CSX] (archived Aug. 31, 2014) (describing the
relationship between international treaties and U.S. federal law).
293.
See Blanchfield, supra note 134, at 8 (explaining that some senators view
ratification of international treaties as "favoring international law over U.S.
constitutional law and self-government, thereby undermining U.S. sovereignty");
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra
note 292, at 6- 14 (describing the lengthy process required for a treaty to incorporated
into U.S. federal law).
294.
See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
INSTRUMENTS, supra note 292, at 15, 285 (noting that "[i]ncreased [Senate] recognition
has been given to the importance of economic treaties, including consular, investment,
and tax agreements," but cautioning that "legally binding human rights treaties ha[ve]
been controversial" because members of the U.S. government fear "that internationally
determined human rights could have an impact on rights of American citizens under
the U.S. Constitution"); see also Jackie Kucinich, She The People's Guide to the
International Women's Rights Treaty You Have Never Heard Of, WASH. POST (June 25,
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/she-the-people/wp/2014/06/25/she-the-peoplesguide-to-the-international-womens-rights-treaty-you-have-never-heard-ofl (last visited Sept.
12, 2014) [http://perma.cc/T57T-9JHR] (archived Sept. 12, 2014) [hereinafter She the
People] ("In 1980, President Jimmy Carter sent the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee a treaty for ratification outlining basic human rights for women around the
world. Over 30 years later, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is where it
remains.").
295.
See CEDAW Ratifications, supra note 233, at 3 (indicating that the United
States has signed, but never ratified, CEDAW); see also She the People, supra note 294.
296.
See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 257 (indicating that
the United States signed the Convention in 1995, but has failed to ratify it); UN Issues
Call on Member States to Ratify Convention on Rights of the Child, supra note 257
(reporting that "Somalia, South Sudan and the United States are the only Member
States that have not ratified [the Convention]").
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reservations, encouraging the adoption of these international
instruments is thus an incomplete solution. 297
Second, as discussed in Part III.B, none of the international
instruments providing maternity protection offer sufficient means of
enforcement even for countries that are signatories. Even under the
CEDAW Optional Protocol, the most coercive of enforcement measure
29 8
the Committee decision's only
in any of the discussed conventions,
party. 29 9 There is no means
state
the
to
remedy is a recommendation
30 0
The WFRC has
of ensuring that the recommendation is followed.
30
offers the
which
MPC,
The
whatsoever.
no enforcement mechanism
but
mechanism
enforcement
no
has
also
most maternity protections,
to
attesting
statement
a
signing
provide
to
rather requires signatories
302
are
that
states
by
signed
only
is
MPC
the
Thus,
their compliance.
already following its recommendations; it has no authority to compel
that the recommendations be followed. Moreover, even if these
conventions were strongly enforceable, countries are free to take
reservations against the conventions, including the enforcement
provision.303 Given these weaknesses in enforcement, none of the
international instruments is particularly effective in addressing
maternity discrimination in countries not already willing to do so.

For the view that CEDAW and the MPC are sufficiently flexible to allow
297.
adoption without displacing domestic law, see Blanchfield, supra note 134, at 14
(suggesting that, because CEDAW "leav[es] it up to States Parties to determine what
actions are appropriate based on their domestic laws and policies," CEDAW "could be
ratified by countries with a wide range of domestic laws and policies"); EVE C. LANDAU
& YVES BEIGBEDER, FROM ILO STANDARDS TO EU LAW: THE CASE OF EQUALITY
BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN AT WORK 136 (2008) (explaining that, when the ILO was
revising the MPC, "increased flexibility was a stated goal of the ILO Employers group,
the ILO Secretariat and some industrialized countries, who considered that it would
facilitate ratification of the new Convention by a greater number of Member States").
See supra Part III.B (surveying the enforcement mechanisms of CEDAW,
298.
the Optional Protocol, WFRC, and MPC).
See Optional Protocol, supra note 243, arts. 7(3)-(5), 8-9 (indicating that
299.
makes a decision, it can make recommendations to and invite
Committee
the
once
reports from a State Party accused of violating the Convention); Blanchfield, supra
note 134, at 2-3 (discussing the function of the CEDAW Committee); Felipe G6mez Isa,
supra 259, at 303-05, 313-16 (explaining that once the Committee reaches a decision
and makes any recommendations, the state is required to report its efforts "to
implement the [Committee's] recommendations" and noting that the Committee may
continue to monitor the state by requesting additional reports).
See Optional Protocol, supra note 243, art. 10(1) (explaining that "[e]ach
300.
State Party may . .. declare that it does not recognize the competence of the Committee
provided for in articles 8 and 9," the articles outlining the Committee's powers of
enforcement).
See WFRC, supra note 231.
301.
See MPC, supra note 231.
302.
See, e.g., Optional Protocol, supra note 243, art. 10(1) (permitting parties to
303.
refuse recognition of the articles outlining the Committee's enforcement powers); supra
notes 242-45 and accompanying text (discussing the many reservations taken against
CEDAW's enforcement mechanism).
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It is also worth noting that CEDAW is one of the most highly
ratified UN conventions, and yet the problem of maternity
discrimination persists. 804 This raises questions about the basic
effectiveness of CEDAW as an instrument, most probably due to the
problem of enforcement. Thus, these instruments, while proving that
maternity discrimination is a problem that can and should be dealt
with on an international scale, illustrate that an international
convention alone is not the solution at this time. However, the success
of international human rights instruments like the Geneva
Convention and Universal Declaration on Human Rights illustrate
the potential good that can come from such an instrument, both in
providing actual standards and in creating global pressure to conform
to international norms. 05 Thus, this Note's ultimate solution works
toward an international solution by first focusing on implementing
effective domestic regimes.
B. The Model Law Approach
When the international community is viewed by analogy to the
United States federal system, the reluctance of some countries to
adopt international conventions becomes more understandable. Like
the United Nations, the United States is a conglomerate of sovereign
states, each with their own unique cultures and interests. When
representatives of these sovereigns consider legislation on the
national level, they do so with the knowledge that it is possible that
whatever policy they enact will displace the laws already passed by a
state's sovereigns. Thus, the federal government is historically
unwilling to take up far-reaching policy questions that may be
contrary to state law unless there is a compelling reason to do so. It is
often only after a substantial number of states have already taken
similar actions that the federal government follows to nationalize the
policy. A case in point is the FMLA, which was adopted by the federal
government only after twenty-three states adopted similar
measures. 306 The FMLA is an example of how the adoption of a
similar law by many sovereigns can inspire a boarder authority to
take action. A model law approach has four benefits over traditional
international law making. First, it would appeal to states that, like

304.
See CEDAW Ratifications, supra note 233 (indicating that there are 99
signatories and 188 parties to CEDAW).
305.
See generally Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States:

Socialization and InternationalHuman Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004) (arguing
that international conventions are able to change state behavior through three forms of
pressure: coercion, persuasion, and acculturation).
306.
See Expecting Better, supra note 135, at 12 (citing Waldfogel, Family Leave
Coverage, supra note 137) (noting that "23 states had passed FMLA laws prior to the
1993 enactment of the federal FMLA"); supra Part III.A(i) (discussing the impact of
federalism on U.S. national legislation and the passage of FMLA).
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the United States, are traditionally reluctant to adopt international
standards because of the displacement of domestic law. That the
United States is a signatory to CEDAW arguably demonstrates
agreement with its requirements; however, because of the reluctance
of the Senate to approve instruments like CEDAW, its protections are
denied to American women. The United States would be far more
likely to adopt a purely domestic model law than to accede to an
international convention containing the exact same provisions
because of the supremacy issues involved. 307 Moreover, the
accessibility of a model law opens up the possibility of adoption by
political units within a country. In the United States, for example,
states could adopt the law regardless of the federal government's
position, perhaps eventually prompting the federal government to
follow though the sort of action that inspired the law in the first
place.30 8
Second, countries could modify the model to fit their specific
needs. This would also be a benefit for countries that may be facing
unique challenges not addressed by a general convention as well as
for states that, like the United States, are concerned about the impact
of national legislation on existing law. In either of these situations,
the state could modify the model law to fit their specific needs rather
than having to abide by both domestic and international laws that
may or may not conflict.
Third, the model law would provide the universal standard of
gender equality envisioned in the CEDAW. This Note discussed only
three national regimes, yet the differences among them were striking.
While these regimes were chosen to be representative, they failed to
cover the vast array of protections provided to women in different
countries. The widespread adoption of a substantially similar
domestic maternity protection scheme would provide the same rights
to women regardless of their citizenship, thus furthering the goals of
conventions like CEDAW and the Universal Declaration of Human
309
Rights to provide all citizens of the world with equal rights.
Finally, just as the state adoptions of FMLA-like statutes led to
the national FMLA law in the United States, the widespread
domestic adoption of a comprehensive maternity protection plan
would make the adoption of a truly effective international convention

Cf. Koh, supranote 290.
307.
See supra note 140 and accompanying text (explaining that the U.S. federal
308.
government often follows individual states in adopting laws and providing the example
of the FMLA laws, which were adopted by 23 states before being adopted by the federal
government).
See CEDAW, supra note 35, art. 2 (stating the parties' commitment to
309.
"condemn discrimination against women in all its forms"); Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, supra note 39, art. 2 (recognizing that "[e]veryone is entitled to all the
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction any kind").
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on maternity protection more likely.3 1 0 At the time CEDAW was
adopted, the protections embodied in Article 11(2) were foreign to
many of the signatories, sparking the large number of reservations.3 11
The adoption of a model law would make the eventual adoption of an
international instrument more likely because the ratification of such
an instrument would be in line with existing domestic regimes. Also,
the wide ratification of an instrument is more likely to encourage
even non-signatories to comply through the weight of global pressure
to conform. 312
C. The Global Maternity ProtectionAct
The model act's title-The Global Maternity Protection Actreflects both the global nature of the law and the goal of a
comprehensive solution to maternity discrimination rather than one
focused only on the provision of leave or benefits. Based on the
recommendations of commentators and the successes and failures of
existing domestic and international solutions, the Act has five major
parts: (1) the provision of paid maternity leave, including a period of
compulsory leave; (2) the extension of benefits to co-parents that are
equal or near-equal those offered to mothers; (3) the provision of
state-sponsored child care; (4) the provision of medical care to
mothers and children; and (5) employment protections for women who
take leave and all mothers, including an enforcement mechanism.
The Global Maternity Protection Act has three levels of
enforcement: mandates, recommendations, and discretionary
decisions. Each of the five provisions below contains a mandate, such
as a minimum pay level or range of acceptable leave allowances,
which must be met by an adopting state. Each provision also contains
either a recommendation or a policy within the mandated range that
would offer the optimal protection. However, states would have no
obligation to follow this recommendation. All of the provisions
additionally leave a margin of discretion to the state in
implementation, both in determining the optimal policy for it within
the mandated range and in determining funding, implementation,
enforcement, and a number of other issues surrounding adoption.
Nonetheless, the model law is exactly that: a model. Any entity,

310.
See Expecting Better, supra note 135 (suggesting that federal laws, such as
the federal FMLA regulations, have often been adopted following widespread adoption
of such laws by individual states).
311.
See generally CEDAW Ratifications, supra note 233 (listing the
declarations and reservations of countries who have ratified, acceded to, or succeeded
from CEDAW).
312.
See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 305 (arguing that international
conventions are able to change state behavior through coercion, persuasion, and
acculturation).
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whether a country, province, or city, can adopted the act to fit its
unique needs.
Any successful maternity protection scheme must include paid
maternity leave. Though it has not been able to completely eradicate
problems of maternity discrimination, paid maternity leave has been
a useful tool in combatting many facets of the three major
problems.31 3 Commentators have argued that maternity leave is most
effective when it is at least six weeks long but begins to counteract
employment equality goals after two years. 3 14 Thus, the Act would
mandate a minimum leave period in that wide range, and the state
will decide the exact length within the effective range. At least one
commentator has argued that forty weeks is the ideal length for
maternity leave.3 1 5 According to Ruhm, children's health benefits
from parental leave peak at that point. 316 Thus, the Act would
recommend a leave period of forty weeks.3 17
The Act would also include a compulsory leave period before and
after the birth of the child. Despite the suspicion that sometimes
surrounds compulsory leave, it can be effective in relieving the
pressure on new mothers to return to work as quickly as possible and
warding off any resentment by her employer for her failure to do so.
The compulsory leave period must be long enough to allow the mother
time to, at a minimum, prepare for and recover from childbirth.
Generally, postpartum doctor's visits are scheduled six weeks after
birth, when substantial recovery is expected.3 18 Based on this medical
marker, the Act would recommend a minimum compulsory leave of
six weeks. However, acknowledging the varied needs of mothers and
businesses, it would allow a compulsory leave period between two and
eight weeks.
As for pay, the Act would recommend full compensation equal to
a woman's prior salary or, if the woman was formerly unemployed, to
the national minimum wage. Influenced by the MPC's standard, the
Act would allow a minimum compensation of two-thirds the woman's
previous income, with a lower boundary of national minimum

313.

See supraPart II.B (discussing the development of paid maternity leave).

314.

See, e.g., Ruhm, ParentalLeave and Child Health, supra note 27, at 16-23.

Id.
315.
Id.
316.
317.
To be clear, the minimum leave period is the minimum amount of time an
employer must allow a woman to take in connection with the birth of a child. The
woman is permitted to return sooner (subject to the conditions of the compulsory leave
period) and employers may offer their employees as much additional time as the
employer chooses.
318.
See Recovering from Birth, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Sept. 27,
2010), http://www.womenshealth.gov/pregnancy/childbirth-beyond/recovering-from-birth.html
(last visited Aug. 31, 2014) [http://perma.ccl88UW-ZYES] (archived Aug. 31, 2014)
(indicating that postpartum doctors visits are scheduled about six weeks after birth).
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wage.3 19 The Act would recommend that benefits be paid by social
security but allow for payment by social security, employers, or a
combination.
Following the UK's lead, the Act would mandate extension of
benefits that are equal or near-equal those offered to mothers to coparents. The Act would define co-parent broadly to include spouses,
non-spousal partners, same-sex partners, or any other relationship
where the person would have responsibility for the child's upbringing
equal to or second only to the mother's. The mandate for equal time is
in recognition of the OECD's concern about the Swedish system's
negative effect on gender pay equality. 3 20 The OECD theorized that
one of the reasons for Sweden's large pay gap was that women took
significant parental leave while men took relatively little.32 1 Thus,
the provision of substantially equal parental leave to both mothers
and fathers would be perhaps the most important part of the Act in
furthering the goals of gender equality and closing the pay gap.
The Act would mandate that men be given substantially equal
access to parental leave. The Act would require a compulsory leave
period for co-parents equivalent to the compulsory leave period for
mothers, whatever the state determines that may be. Additionally,
the Act would mandate a minimum leave period within the same
range as for mothers (between six weeks and two years), again to be
equivalent to that adopted for mothers. As with mothers, fathers
could elect to return to work sooner than this minimum period.
However, employers could not take adverse action against fathers
who elected to take their full amount of parental leave.
The Act would require the provision of state-sponsored child
care. Funding for this care would be within the discretion of the state.
State funding would be a given for states like Sweden, where such
care is already available. But even for countries like the United
States that are more resistant to state-sponsored social programs,
there is a precedent. For the United States, compliance with this
provision could be as simple as expanding access to the federally

319.
See MPC, supra note 231, art. 6(2)-(3) (mandating that "cash
benefits ... be at a level which ensures that the woman can maintain herself and her
child" and requiring that "cash benefits paid with respect to leave ... based on
previous earnings, ... shall not be less than two-thirds of the woman's previous
earnings or of such of those earnings as are taken into account for the purpose of
computing benefits").
320.
See Closing the Gender Gap, supra note 108 (reporting that "[i]n 2011,
Swedish women earned 14% less than men" and that "[t]he pay gap is even larger
(21%) among parents").
321.
See OECD, OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: SWEDEN 86 (Dec. 17, 2012),
available at http://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/Sweden%202012%200verview.pdf
(last
visited Sept. 19, 2014) [http://perma.cc/G48T-CSZU] (archived Sept. 19, 2014)
(indicating that Sweden offers parental leaves to both genders, but that "women tak[e]
most of them" and that women who take a 16-month parental leave "have been less
likely to see a progress in their careers once back on the job").
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subsidized Head Start preschool program, offering tax refunds to
parents for the cost of child care, or even expanding the public school
system. 322 States would be required to provide access to such care for
each child from the end of the state's maternity leave requirement to
the time when mandatory schooling begins. Under the Act's
recommendations, then, states would be required to provide child
care from forty weeks after birth (the recommended minimum leave
period) until the age of five (the average age when formal schooling
begins).
The Act would mandate the provision of medical care to mothers
and children, and funding for this requirement would be left to the
discretion of the states. Again, there is precedent both in countries
that already provide universal state-sponsored healthcare and in
countries like the United States that do not. In the United States, the
Women, Infants, and Children Program (WIC) provides health care
and food subsidies to women who qualify. 323 To meet the Act's
requirement, the United States would only have to expand WIC to
cover all new mothers and their children. It would be within the
state's discretion to determine how to fund this expansion, including
by requiring covered families to pay premiums based on income.
However, the Act would recommend that health care, including food
subsidies when needed, be covered by the state.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Act would mandate
employment protections for all mothers who take leave, and it would
include an enforcement mechanism. As has been discussed
throughout this Note, the lack of adequate discrimination protections
is where other maternity protection regimes, both domestic and
international, have failed. Thus, this requirement would leave less
discretion to states. The Act would flatly forbid termination of
employment, in whole or in part, due to pregnancy, familial status, or
use of parental leave for either men or women. Additionally, the Act
would forbid negative employment action such as demotion, passing
over, reassignment, transfer, lack of advancement due to pregnancy,
familial status, or use of leave. Employers would be forbidden from
inquiring about the familial status of job applicants or employees
being evaluated for promotion and would be forbidden from
considering such information in decision making, including in
determining pay, once it was disclosed. The Act would allow none of

See Head Start Services, OFFICE OF HEAD START, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/
322.
programs/ohs/about/head-start (last visited Sept. 23, 2014) [http://perma.cc/9S-JNBM]
(archived Sept. 23, 2014) (describing the services and goals of the Head Start Program).
See Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), USDA FOOD & NUTRITION SERV.,
323.
http://www.fns.usda.gov/wic/women-infants-and-children-wic
(last visited Sept. 6,
2014) [http://perma.cc/K695-D5PB] (archived Sept. 6, 2014) (explaining that, through
WIC, the federal government "provides . . . grants to States for supplemental foods,
health care referrals, and nutrition education" for qualifying women and "infants and
children up to age five").
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the exceptions found in the UK's Regulations or Sweden's Parental
Leave Act for failure to comply when compliance is deemed
impracticable without a significant showing of hardship on the part of
the employer, which cannot be based solely or even largely on the
employee's familial status or use of leave. 324 As the UK's continuingly
dismal pregnancy discrimination figures illustrate, such loopholes
allow too much room for abuse. 325
States would have discretion in how they wished to enforce these
requirements. For example, it would be more consistent with U.S.
policy and concerns to make the Act enforceable through private
litigation, as is the case with other civil rights actions, while
countries with more robust regulatory schemes, like Sweden, might
be more comfortable enforcing through government action. Subject to
the above mandates, states would be free to erect their own legal
standards for compliance.
The Global Maternity Protection Act outlined here differs from
most maternity protection regimes in only two respects: the length of
and
the strict
to co-parents
parental leave available
antidiscrimination standards. 326 These changes are crucial for
combatting the ongoing global problem of discrimination and pay
inequality despite the widespread adoption of the remainder of the
provisions. As for the remaining provisions, the usefulness of paid
maternity leave has been the focus of a great deal of this Note,
especially Part II. Sweden's record-setting female workforce
participation rate proves the efficacy of child care, and statesponsored health care has been widely adopted by the majority of the
world's countries, save the United States. Together, these five
provisions, along with the benefits of the model law itself, as
previously outlined, would be a significant step forward in the fight
against maternity discrimination.

324.
See, e.g., Regulations, supra note 121, at Regulation 18, 20 (providing
exceptions to the UK Regulations' requirements where it is not reasonably practicable
for the employer to comply); Parental Leave Act, supra note 122, at §§ 14, 20 (noting
exceptions to the Act when compliance is not practicable or would result in a
"substantial disturbance to the employer's activity").
325.
See supra Part III.A(ii) (discussing the challenges facing paid maternity
leave reform in the United Kingdom).
326.
Compare supra Part IV.C (proposing a Global Maternity Protection Act
with flat prohibitions and minimum paid leave lasting between 6 and 40 weeks), with
supra Part III.A (discussing current antidiscrimination standards and parental leave
in the United States, United Kingdom, and Sweden), and supra Part III.B (analyzing
international antidiscrimination and parental leave standards in CEDAW, the WFRC,
and the MPC).
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CONCLUSION

Women's roles in the workplace have been growing steadily for
the past half-century. Yet, in everything from pay to advancement,
of this
persists.
Much
gender
discrimination
workplace
discrimination is based on women's unique role in society as child
bearers. Numerous domestic and international efforts to address this
discrimination have been made over the past 150 years, especially
throughout the twentieth century, but none have been completely
successful. Drawing from the history of maternity leave legislation,
the original and most popular maternity protection, as well as the
example of domestic and international regimes, the Global Maternity
Protection Act provides global protection for a global problem and
aims to make all women equal by providing them with the same
benefits and protections, regardless of nationality. The Global
Maternity Protection Act has benefits over current international
protections and over purely domestic solutions of providing universal
equality because the Global Maternity Protection Act is easily
adopted and enforced by states.
The world's women have been stuck on the mommy track for
long enough. It is time to get off.
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